Book Reviews

North Africa's Desperate Regimes

Review Article by Clement M. Henry

The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco, by Susan Slyomovics. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005. ix + 204. Notes to p. 243. Bibl. to p. 262. Index to 268. Acknowl. to p. 271. $55 cloth; $24.95 paper.

Searching for a Different Future: The Rise of a Global Middle Class in Morocco, by Shana Cohen. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. x + 144 pages. Notes to p. 161. Refs. to p. 168. Index to p. 177. $74.95 cloth; $21.95 paper.

La memoire du temps, Maroc, pays de l'inachevé [*A Memoir of the Times, Morocco, Unifinished Country*], by Lahcen Brouksy. Paris: Editions Publisud, 2004. 204 pages. n.p.

Le Développement Asiatique: quels enseignements pour les economies arabes? Eléments de stratégie de développement: le cas de l'Algérie [*Asian Development: What Lessons for the Arab Economies?*], by Abdelkader Sid Ahmed. Paris: Editions Publisud, 2004. 204 pages. 136 pages. Appendix to p. 137. Bibl. to p. 169. n.p.

Bouteflika: une imposture algérienne [*Bouteflika: An Algerian Deception*], by Mohamed Benchicou. Algiers: Editions Le Matin and Paris: Jean Picollec, 2004. 222 pages. Bibl. to p. 223. Bios. to p. 238. Index of names to p. 245. Contents p. 247. n.p.

A History of Modern Tunisia, by Kenneth J. Perkins. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xvii + 212 pages. Maps. Illust. Notes to p. 226. Suggested readings to p. 240. Index to p. 249. $70 cloth; $24.99 paper.

Science et pouvoir dans la Tunisie contemporaine [*Science and Power in Contemporary Tunisia*], by François Siino. Paris: Editions Karthala and Aix-en-Provence: IREMAM, 2004. 376 pages. Appends. to p. 391. Bibl. to p. 397. List of tables and contents to p. 405. n.p.

Le mal arabe — Entre dictatures et intégrismes: la démocratie interdite, [*Arab Evil — Between Dictators and Fundamentalists: Democracy Prohibited*], by Moncef Marzouki. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004. 181 pages. Appends to p. 190. n.p.

Regime change seems less of a priority for the Maghrib than for America's more favored stomping grounds in the Near East and Persian Gulf, but all three of the Western Mediterranean regimes that gained independence from France face mid-life crises as they turn 50 or try, in Algeria, to recover from an earlier suicide attempt. They are all desperately "performing" human rights for angry audiences at home as well as for overseas governments and investors, for whom they are also brushing up on the latest trends in "governance." This collection of recent books about Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia conveys some of the popular rage against these desperate regimes as well as educated observations

about them.

Susan Slyomovics, a distinguished anthropologist at MIT, weaves an "unusual discursive formation" (p. 3) from her interviews with Moroccan victims of torture and documents their popular performances of human rights activities. She is less interested in the political gymnastics of states, but the title of her eloquent book has added punch in the context of this review: regimes, too, "perform" human rights, that is, they make a show of respecting them rather than actually enforcing the rule of law. That they have to pay some lip service to human rights, however, is already a measure of their desperation in the face of widespread outrage. The late King Hassan II, whose police services were reputed to be the busiest and cruelest of the Maghrib, created an Advisory Committee on Human Rights (ACHR) in 1990. His skeletons were already out of the closet as early as 1986, in the form of testimonials published in France (Abraham Serfaty, cited p. 22 n35), and even in Morocco, before the censor stopped Abdelkader Chaoui's book, *The Unachieved Past* (1987), after it sold 1,000 copies (p. 81). The king perhaps also anticipated that the end of the Cold War was diminishing Morocco's strategic value and hence making his regime more vulnerable to international criticism.

As they express themselves, creating new public spaces for civil society, Slyomovics' informants also document the limits of Morocco's newfound concern for human rights. The ACHR took eight years to admit that Morocco, like Argentina or Chile in their unhappier days, had actually "disappeared" people and to name some 112 of them, an "absurdly low" number (p. 22), 56 of whom were declared dead without any further information and the remainder missing, abroad or perhaps also deceased. After Muhammad VI succeeded his father in 1999, the new king commanded the ACHR to implement plans for an independent Indemnity Commission to compensate the families of the "disappeared" ones and other victims of his father's regime. As of January 2003 the Commission had received some 15,000 requests for indemnities, including 9,000 filed past the original December 31, 1999, deadline (see p. 191). To put these numbers in comparative perspective, Algerian family associations are seeking information about 6,446 relatives who were "disappeared" during the 1990s.[1] (The real but undeclared number may be far higher.) What is really at stake, however, is the rule of law and accountability. Neither Morocco nor Algeria seems ready to render its police accountable, and that is the principal grievance of many of Slyomovics' informants and of Algerians, too, if newspaper reports are credible.

Slyomovics captures many of the poignant feelings of women who lost their children, husbands, and fathers, but only elliptically implies that it may be harder on a Muslim woman than on an Argentinian or Chilean to lose her husband in legal limbo. One of her informants complained that she could not get a passport or her son's diploma, both requiring a husband's signature, since she could not prove he was either dead or alive (p. 64). The larger question is whether Morocco's two waves of repression, against the leftists in the 1960s and 1970s and against the Islamists in the 1980s, will end or whether America's War on Terror, coupled with the Casablanca bombings of May 13, 2003, is inspiring a third wave.

Slyomovics devotes a full chapter, in addition to a general one on prison, to "Islamist Political Prisoners." Among her older generation of the 1980s there were still anxious discussions about the propriety of engaging in hunger strikes, which could be viewed as a form of suicide and hence against the teachings of Islam. A compromise was to engage in rolling hunger strikes, prisoners taking turns of 24 or 48 hours. The new generation, framed by suicide bombings, has no such misgivings: the first of over 1,000 Islamist hunger strikers died on May 10, 2005.[2] Slyomovics documents the continued US

1. *El Watan*, June 2, 2005.
2. *Middle East International*, May 27, 2005, p. 20.

outsourcing of suspected terrorists to Morocco's "newest specialized torture center" in Temara near Rabat.

Morocco evidently continues to enjoy a special competitive advantage in the War On Terror, in that "the international community recognizes Moroccan expertise in torture" (p. 194). How confident can we be that the Moroccan government's grudging admissions of human rights violations will really translate into "Never This Again," the title (without a question mark) of her final chapter and slogan of the Moroccan human rights movement? One answer is that the police apparatus is gobbling up ever more prisoners than they are releasing. More ominously, one of her informants, a human rights activist and former victim whom the new king coopted to head the Indemnity Commission, seems to have been corralled into the royal stables. "To the charge of allowing the perpetrators to go free, [Driss] Benzekri advances an overarching perspective that acknowledges the stranglehold of Morocco's pervasive culture of impunity" (p. 197). Circles of people finally articulating their past suffering may indeed be permeating civil society from the ground up, but the first and apparently, since this book does not cite more recent ones, the last anniversaries celebrating their martyrs were conducted in 1999, the first and best year of King Muhammad VI's human rights "performances."

Populating the civil society of newly if temporarily empowered victims and their families is another variant of the "new middle class" (NMC) that Manfred Halpern celebrated in 1963 (*The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton University Press). Shana Cohen updates the travails of this class in Morocco, despite the fact that her book, originally a Berkeley Ph.D. dissertation in sociology, gives no reference to Halpern's classic work. Cohen's "global middle class" (GMC) of Moroccans in a new post-national as well as post-colonial age deepens the mystery and ambiguities surrounding the original NMC but also testifies to the pervasive political alienation of a new generation of college-educated aspiring elites. The NMC had been an imaginary construct of shared consciousness of a national mission.

Cohen uncritically conveys this optimistic, Promethean aspect of Halpern's MNC: "The modern middle class… saw itself as the vanguard of progress…. [and] represents a modern class because its members translate change, development, in terms of themselves..." (pp. 137, 141). But in fact the "vanguard" never materialized in Morocco because the *makhzan* (the official state apparatus of the army and civil service) preferred in 1965 to assassinate its prime leader and exemplar, Mehdi Ben Barka. Her GMC is the counterpoint to this mythical NMC: "Conversely, the young, urban, educated make up the global middle class because they share the same inability to equate collective representation and the external environment with steps of individual change" (p. 141). In other words, in place of the NMC's shared (if usually frustrated) aspirations, the new, "global" middle class is united by a common inability to share a national purpose. In the dismal 1990s they just lapsed into "melancholy." "In this moment of transition between the nation-state and globalization, melancholia — the loss of an ideal, a past object of identification, and the subsequent internalization of this loss — becomes the psychic unifier of a seemingly disparate group of people and the basis for social action" (p. 109). This seems quite a stretch, though one can observe a lot of nostalgia in the Maghrib for the early days of independence. This nostalgia seems more pervasive, however, among Algerian than Moroccan elites. Many Algerians regret the liquidation of Algerian industry at the hands of Houari Boumédiènne's successors after 1978, whereas their Moroccan counterparts are more likely to remember classmates being tortured and thrown out of airplanes in the 1960s.

Postmodern sociology supplemented by quotes from Harvard's Homi Bhabha is not particularly helpful for understanding Morocco, but Cohen's informants have their stories that, added to those of Slyomovics, project a deep sense of alienation within Moroccan elites. Strangely, despite many visits and three years of living in Casablanca, Cohen has

less to say about political Islam than Slyomovics, perhaps because her sample of 70 educated Moroccans happens to be disproportionately secular or uncaring. She remarks in passing that the women she interviewed who worked in the private sector service industries "often distinguished themselves and each other socially by smoking, drinking, going out at night, and wearing clothing brought from France or the United States…In contrast, women who are unemployed or who work in public administration often wear more conservative clothing and do not smoke or drink either because of social norms or religious practice" (p. 26). Her penultimate chapter is entitled "A Generation of Fuyards [escapists]" but may underestimate the capacities of a renovated Moroccan vanguard, replenished with new graduates recruited by the Islamists and other opposition parties in an emerging political culture of human rights that Slyomovics' prisoners continue to articulate.

The very title of Lahcen Brouksy's book is intended as a "cry of intellectual revolt" (p. 9), but Dr. Brouksy is also not only a political scientist and expert in rural development, with administrative as well as academic experience, but also a seasoned politician who, as the deputy from Oulmes, 1977-83, served a parliamentary brain trust attached to Mahjoubi Ahardan's Popular Movement. He is wily in the ways of feckless Moroccan pluralism and understands the power of the *makhzan* to manipulate, divide, and rule. He sees Morocco as a work in progress, "leaving behind an authoritarian century yet without fully entering the new liberal era" (p. 8) — stuck, in short, in some sort of transition that may be a never-ending process. He sees Moroccan democracy, promising once upon a time, as broken down (*"en panne"*) despite a solid history of responsible trade-unionism, industrious Fassi and Soussi bourgeoisies, and reasonably decent public administration. He does not present solutions or predictions but makes sharp and well informed observations about Morocco's political landscape.

One important change is that the heart of the system, the *makhzan*, is now run by young technocrats who tend by their training to put economics ahead of politics. The wealthy are becoming ever more so, although the bourgeoisie in Brouksy's views is not ready to meet the challenges of globalization. It supports a civil society of NGOs (non-governmental organizations), but these in turn should be more deeply concerned with the growing poverty of the rural masses. Brouksy notes that no serious land reform was ever undertaken and consequently the rural exodus to the cities has accelerated despite efforts since the 1960s to keep these miserable people out of Morocco's clean-cut colonial cities. The situation is so bad that 30,000 young Moroccans annually risk their lives to cross the Mediterranean illegally.

In parliament, his brain trust of rustics from the Berber Popular Movement had surprised the *makhzan* in 1978 by promoting the same radical "middle class" ideas as their urban cousins in Mehdi Ben Barka's party, all of them being college graduates who had once belonged to the Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM). A quarter of a century later Brouksy articulates the same ideas but also sharply criticizes all of Morocco's political parties — some 37 of them, if 13 new ones get approved (p. 38) — for being utterly out of touch with their society. He cites Mehdi Ben Barka, who had warned in 1963 that the politicians of the Left were already out of touch with their constituents. And Brouksy notes that the same familiar faces, including 'Abdullah Ibrahim, who briefly served as prime minister in 1964, were resurfacing with their old quarrels that block any progress.

Brouksy sounds alarm bells: "Terrorism engendered by radical political Islam has nested in our middle class, a disarticulated, pauperized, illiterate, uncultivated [one] of blocked horizons, left to go mad. This formless social swamp has been taken hostage" (p. 201). The solution is not more counter-terrorism legislation that further undermines justice but rather to face up to Morocco's social problems. "The authorities, the *makhzan*, the state are in need of a drastic overhaul in the face of social effervescence that rejects immobilism"

(p. 202). The missing link, for Brouksy as for any putative middle class vanguard, would be a representative yet efficient political party system.

If Morocco, despite a luxuriant political pluralism, suffers from a lack of political intermediation, the Algerian illness is more severe, although the regime survived a radical Islamic onslaught, perhaps exaggerated its violence to marginalize it politically, yet still reports enough attacks in peripheral regions to justify a continued state of emergency. Although more "progressive" than Morocco in the 1960s, it remains more reticent about its "disappeared" today, perhaps because extensive repression in Algeria, as in neighboring Tunisia to the east, is a more recent phenomenon. In short, Morocco is at the forefront of the formation of any new civil society, while the earlier nationalist generations of Algeria and Tunisia now lag in public recollections of their respective experiences of repression.

With the breakup of Algeria's single-party system in 1988, over 60 new parties were formed, but they are even less plausible than their Moroccan counterparts, some of which at least enjoy historical legitimacy. By contrast, Algeria's historical National Liberation Front, as Muhammad Benchicou knows well, was never more than a battlefield for personal clienteles of the presidency and contending power centers in the army. But before reviewing his polemic against President Abdelaziz 'Abd al-'Aziz Bouteflika, Algeria's dismal political economy deserves attention.

Abdelkader Sid Ahmed, an economics professor based in Paris, is so discouraged that he turns to the Asian development state as a possible model for Algeria. Sid Ahmed used to advise Boumédiènne's economic czar, Belaid Abdesselam, and he also consulted for President Mohammed Boudiaf, Algeria's savior brought in by the generals in 1992 to govern the country but then assassinated after six months by one of their factions for becoming too popular, too legitimate, and too serious about cracking down on corruption. Professor Sid Ahmed understands Algeria to have lost 20 years of development, 1979-99, resulting from the change of economic policy after Boumédiènne's death in 1978. Others may argue that the policy of "industrializing industries" pursued by Belaid Abdesselam in the 1970s was unsustainable. But Sid Ahmed is expressing nostalgia for the Boumédiènne era that is widely shared within Algeria's educated middle class. Like so many other Algerians he laments the current contradiction between the country's $30 billion of reserves ($45 billion by the end of 2004) and massive unemployment, deterioration of social services, disintegration of public sector industry, and dispersion of ten of thousands of engineers and other technical formed at great expense by the Algerian state (p. 13).

In this reviewer's opinion, however, the model of the Asian development state is really not relevant to Algeria or indeed to the rest of the Arab world, despite supposed sightings of Tigers on the Nile and in Tunisia. Algeria exaggerates the general tendency in its neighborhood of overpriced labor that is no longer competitive in international markets. The Asian development model depended on disciplined labor forces that, for better or worse, have no place in Algeria's rentier economy. It is not just the oil but also the proximity to France that corrupts any competitive international pricing of labor. Beyond extensive French-style theorizing with lots of footnotes including a lot of Anglo-American literature, Sid Ahmed does not have any concrete suggestions of productive niches where Algeria might, apart from oil and gas, enjoy some comparative advantage. He does not do any strategic homework that might highlight, for instance, Algeria's competitive edge in tourism (the Sahara) or, looking further ahead, retirement homes for North Europeans (maybe in joint ventures with Tunisians). His conclusion that European aid should give priority to "*la formation des elites et l'émergence des classes moyennes*" for the sake of technology transfer (p. 136) may affirm his own class interest but begs the questions of attracting foreign investment and bringing local talent back home.

Benchicou deserves mention in this review of desperate regimes not so much for the

contents of his book as for the fact that he is in jail. He is the poster child of the Algerian press, serving two years for this polemic against President Bouteflika published in France on the eve of Algeria's 2004 presidential elections. His publisher in Paris has also complained of a break-in.[3] Benchicou had been managing editor of *Le Matin*, a popular French-language daily, also now shut down, that recruited much of its staff from the defunct Marxist *Alger Républicain*. He enjoyed excellent contacts with the French Left and served much of Algeria's Westernized elite with a claimed circulation of 140,000 in 1999 (and a good Internet search engine) — in other words a significant segment of Algeria's new middle class.

His book is full of amusing vignettes displaying the smoke and mirrors of Algerian transparency and legitimacy. It also contains a set of biographies of leading Algerian personalities (pp. 225-38) that is useful for readers who do not have access to Acheur Cheurfi's more extended reference work, *La classe politique algérienne* (Algiers: Casbah Editions, 2001). But it is difficult for this reviewer to take seriously Benchicou's insistence, for instance, that the Americans got the Saudis to make the Emiratis give a key Algerian general the green light in 1998 for Bouteflika to be elected president in 1999 (p. 37).

Benchicou probably provoked the wrath of the regime by profiling Bouteflika as a "*putchiste de carrière*," an accusation that may reflect the author's resentment of the coup that deposed Muhammad Ahmad Ben Bella in 1965 and silenced *Alger Républicain*. Selective quotations by military officers opposed to Bouteflika may have also given offense. It is natural, however, that an elected president — however fair and free those elections really were in 1999 and 2004 — should try to subordinate the military to civilian, i.e. presidential rule. Might some general really have defeated him in a democratic election (p. 59)? Ironically, Benchicou relied heavily for his information on unhappy generals, although some had interesting insights. For instance, the army chief of staff, before retiring after Bouteflika's reelection, declared that a state of emergency was no longer necessary (p. 44). To give one example of its uses, however, the Emergency permitted the regime to confine demonstrations against the American invasion of Iraq to one meeting organized in a closed hall by a Leftist fringe group. As if to sustain the need for emergencv legislation, newspapers were still reporting "terrorist" attacks in peripheral places on almost a daily basis in June 2005.

Although he is less knowledgeable than Sid Ahmed about political economy, Benchicou is an economic nationalist who rejects efforts to modernize Algeria's oil and gas industry. He views Bouteflika's efforts to enact new legislation in 2001 as an apology and surrender to foreign interests sacrificed by the oil nationalizations of 1971 (p. 108). The new legislation, eventually passed after Bouteflika's second electoral victory in 2004, was in fact designed to attract the leading transnationals, Exxon, Shell and BP, not necessarily the French, to risky exploration and development in uncharted territories with the latest technology.

The Algerian writers seem less open to real social and political change than Brouksy, perhaps because they have already experienced too much of it. Tunisians, too, like Moncef Marzouki, are more outspoken about human rights and the need for political change. The successor regime to Bourguiba may, in fact, be the most vulnerable of the three, because Tunisia deserves better governance than its neighbors, given its history. Kenneth Perkins presents an excellent history of modern Tunisia that avoids all polemics but needs to be supplemented by more critical analyses of the Ben 'Ali regime, like those of Siino and Marzouki. By the latter's account Tunisia has taken Morocco's place as North Africa's premier human rights abuser.

Perkins has deftly navigated through tricky terrain to write a good, objective history

3. *El Watan*, June 5, 2005.

that a tourist with intellectual curiosity may be able to carry into Tunisia without being stopped at the airport — or perhaps even purchase inside the country. Cambridge University Press advertises the book as a tourist guide because, alas, serious country studies about such quiet little places no longer sell well in the social sciences. In this spirit the book cleverly opens with an imaginary ride from La Marsa to Tunis on the light railway past Carthage and La Goulette, followed by a walk up the main Avenue Bourguiba to the *medina*, the Kasbah, and eventually another metro ride to the Bardo Palace, all in five pages observing the artifacts of almost three millennia of Tunisian history. The remainder of the book is a scholarly survey of its modern history, 1835-2003, with a critical bibliography for each of seven chronologically arranged chapters. The text is sprinkled with photos of downtown Tunis in the 1920s, Habib Bourguiba's triumphal homecoming in 1955, and many others, as well as posters and postage stamps but also old maps that regrettably were only barely readable.

Perkins's history has to be concise, given the space limitations, but he manages to bring to bear the rich new insights of Tunisian scholars who have been liberated from the Bourguibist monopoly that had tended to identify the individual with the life of the nationalist movement. He treads carefully and tries to be fair yet critical of both Bourguiba and his successor, Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali. For instance, "Bourguiba's embrace of liberal values did not extend to the tolerance of contrary views" (p. 129), whether of Abd al-Aziz Tha'albi in 1937 or Salah Ben Youssef in 1955. Perkins also tactfully lets it remain "uncertain" how "meaningful and satisfying" political changes under Bourguiba's successor, have been (p. 7).

Given these constraints, the author weaves an interesting story. His reminder seems timely that Tunisia's short-lived Constitution of 1864, sometimes vaunted as the first for an Arab country, was imposed by the French and British consuls and had little indigenous support. He also observes that the French administrators in Tunisia looked to Algerian models "more often as examples of what *not* to do" (p. 40). Consequently various generations of educated Tunisian elites had greater opportunities to express themselves and mobilize support than did their Algerian counterparts. We are also informed of some the unexpected impacts of the two world wars. During the first one Tunisians were able to buy back substantial agricultural holdings relinquished by *colons* called to war, and Tunisian merchants temporarily regained markets from others. But 80,000 Tunisian Muslims were also drafted, 20,000 of them becoming casualties on the Western front, and some 5,000 dying in Morocco and Syria. With the end of wartime prosperity and return of demobilized colons as well as the ragged Tunisians, the stage was set for an enlarged and reinvigorated Tunisian nationalism. Again after World War II, the Free French, whom the Allies parachuted back into Tunisia, arrested some 4,000 nationalists, setting the stage for yet another round of nation-building, but until his death in exile in 1948 Moncef bey, who had come to the throne during the war, stole the limelight from both Bourguiba and Ben Youssef. Tunisia perhaps escaped the fate of monarchy (Moroccan style?) because the struggle with France continued a few more years.

Only 82 pages, less than half the book, are devoted to the half century since independence, but the author manages to bring new elements to light, such as (citing an article published by Abdeljelil Temimi in 2000, p. 236) Bourguiba's contacts since 1957 with the World Jewish Congress that prepared the way for his historic speech in 1965 advocating the recognition of Israel within its original boundaries passed by the UN General Assembly in 1947 (pp. 144-45). However, he also misses some important details. For instance, Salah Ben Youssef was assassinated in Frankfurt in 1961, not Cairo (p. 132), and his assailant, at least the one who organized the hit if he did not actually pull the trigger, was hardly "unknown" (p. 129). He was one of Bourguiba's notorious enforcers, head of a party cell near Tunis in the early 1960s, and eventually deputy director of the ruling party.

Perkins also omits former Interior Minister Tahar Belkhodja's very important, balanced political memoir that covers the independence period until his retirement in 1983. And his explanation of the campaign to liberate the French naval base at Bizerta in 1961 may deserve a slightly different emphasis — less attention to Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir's Suez "triumph" and more to Algeria's Mers el Kebir at that juncture. In this reviewer's opinion, he does not sufficiently emphasize or adequately explain Bourguiba's return to unchecked power in 1971-72, culminating in the lifetime presidency cut short by Ben 'Ali. Nor does he present other possible reasons, in addition to those stated by Ben 'Ali and his apologists, for the virulent crackdown on the Islamists in 1991 (p. 193). He does, however, catch the secret of Ben 'Ali's success: "In exchange for protection from the 'green threat' of Islamic radicalism, the majority of secular Tunisians turned a blind eye to excesses committed by the authorities" (p. 194).

His book also usefully documents the evolution of Tunisian arts and literature, including a vigorous cinema industry (though he did not mention *Star Wars* much less the origins of its planet outpost of Tataouine, Tunisia's deep south). Each chronological segment of the arts comes after the politics, as if escaping the heat (cf. p. 198), although artists sometimes convey political truths more effectively in authoritarian regimes than the politicians or elections. Perkins may in fact be taking Tunisian elections too seriously when he concludes "the prospects for democratizing the political system at least by non-violent means, might well be more dismal than at any time since independence" (p. 212). The regime desperately seeks outside approval and, with fewer strategic rents than Morocco or Algeria, is more vulnerable to disapproval from the EU (if less, these days, from the Americans) and the World Bank, which attaches conditions to its lending program. Nowhere in this book is there mention of the gross corruption of the business mafia around the presidency (cf. Marzouki, pp. 97-102) or even, except as an allegation of defense lawyers, of the routine practice of torture annually documented in US State Department Human Rights reports.

François Siino sheds more light on blockages in contemporary Tunisian politics. Dealing with a relatively abstract technical topic, he gained insights into the inner working of a regime that would probably elude students taking a more direct political approach. A climate of fear pervaded Tunisian universities in the 1990s when he was conducting his research. He selected his theme carefully: the relation of Science to Power is a very special one in a developmental dictatorship like Tunisia's, whether under Bourguiba or Ben 'Ali. As the author notes (p. 73), science is a sort of metaphor for politics, because its ostensible rationality covers up any messy conflicting interests and is also the purest expression of development and modernization. Siino extracted 100 fragments from Bourguiba's speeches collected between 1957 and 1980 in praise of science (pp. 387-391). He also points to many gestures of Ben Ali seeking legitimacy by associating with scientific causes, exhibitions, and popular promotions. His description of the 1991 showdown with the Islamists is more nuanced than that of Perkins and shows how the Ben 'Ali regime used science as an ideological weapon against those "obscurantists" (p. 362).

His analysis also explains why Tunisia as currently constituted cannot attain the "knowledge-based economy" that is its ostensible ideal, shared by the liberal Arab intellectuals who authored the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) annual *Arab Human Development Report* (2002-2004). The regime has taken science policy away from the scientists and discouraged any intermediary associations that might have significant inputs. In science as in politics more generally, autonomous intermediaries are viewed as a threat. Tunisian politicians are happy to import successful Tunisian scientists from abroad as long as they do not stay too long and try to wield any effective influence. Despite its "positive" efforts to reverse the brain drain, the UNDP's assistance in bringing them home for visits may have unintentionally contributed to downgrading the local university scientists, tarred with the "syndicalist" image of "constantly demanding supplementary credits

for improbable results" (p. 375). His conclusion looks at the contradictory logics of authoritarian politics and scientific inquiry and understands the isolation of science policy from the scientists to be structural. Scientific meetings are treated like any other public meetings and held under police surveillance (pp. 373-74): although not tortured, the scientists, too, are effectively silenced.

It is too bad that Siino could not update his study, which stops in 1996, to show how Ben 'Ali finally took over the Internet from IRSIT, Tunisia's "Rolls Royce" of scientific research institutes (p. 360), so as to control it with service providers run by his daughter and close friends, backed up by a specialized cyber police to keep track of email and the surfing of websites (some of which are also filtered out). These peculiar practices represent an "advance" of the Tunisians over their Maghribi counterparts, however competitive Morocco remains in the more traditional ones of torture and ballot rigging.

A nice test of the Ben 'Ali regime will be the availability in Tunisia of Dr. Moncef Marzouki's website at www.moncefmarzouki.net in November 2005, if despite international protests, Tunisia actually hosts the United Nations conference on the future of the Internet. As Marzouki observes of Tunisia's surrealistic battle against free information, "Dictators are like bats. They can only prosper far from light" (p. 11).

Dr. Moncef Marzouki is an internationally recognized pediatric neurologist who is also one of Tunisia's leading human rights defenders. By his account he became a radical opponent of the Ben 'Ali regime because he could not excuse torture and refused to accept falsified death certificates in his capacity as president of the Tunisian League of Human Rights (1989-1994). Deprived of his livelihood in Tunisia, he accepted a visiting professorship in 2001 at a leading French medical school but continues to work for human rights for Tunisia and also for the rest of the Arab world. After the Ben 'Ali regime emasculated the Tunisian League of Human Rights in 1994, Marzouki founded the Conseil National pour les Libertés en Tunisie (CNLT) and became President in 1996 of the Arab Commission on Human Rights. In 2001 he founded a political party, the Congrès pour la République, with the objective of ridding the country of its "false republic and democracy."

In this book, he diagnoses the "Arab illness" of the prohibition of democracy by dictators repressing Islamic fundamentalists. The dictators would have had to invent the green threat anyway (p. 112), to justify repressing their frightened middle classes, but there is a way out. Marzouki rejects the position of the "fundamentalist" secularists among his fellow Francophone elite "democrats." He observes that these "fundamentalists" comprise only a minority of the Tunisian elite, albeit a majority of Algeria's putative democrats (p. 146). He argues, however, that the Christian concept of secularism is less relevant to Islam, that most Islamists over a broad spectrum are not totalitarian fanatics, and that it is possible to work with the more reasonable of them while at the same time rejecting possible shari'a demands for medieval corporal punishments.

This review lacks space to go into the details of the 30,000 Tunisians arrested under Ben 'Ali, many of them tortured, the descriptions of hunger strikes and suicides of those set free, and the cries of prisoners Dr. Marzouki heard during his own periods of captivity. He spent four months and at least one other week and another long weekend in Tunis's infamous Ministry of the Interior that also serves as a jail and torture chamber downtown on the Ave. Habib Bourguiba (a bit after the Place du 7 Novembre 1987, cf. Perkins, p. 3, but before the National Theater, on the same side of the street). Dr. Marzouki himself was too well known internationally, with strong ties to Amnesty International, to be physically tortured, but his descriptions of others suffering are as graphic in their way as those of Susan Slyomovics' Moroccans.

Marzouki's book should be translated into English because American policy-makers would benefit from a liberal, basically Western as well as post-Bourguibian Tunisian view of the Arab world. They might dislike some home truths, as on p. 118: "Arab populations

increasingly close themselves off from any discourse about democracy because this term is sauced and served up by those very people who put Arabs and other Muslims in animal cages at Guantanamo and evidently practice a policy of gross double standards" (p. 118). Perhaps Guantanamo will be terminated before this review is published, but much rethinking will be needed to respond to the emerging publics of these desperate regimes. And with luck and help from the EU in encouraging the democratization of the Middle East and North Africa — so as to get rid of terrorism "the bastard of dictatorship" (p. 117) — we will hear more from Dr. Marzouki. Washington's concern with "regime change," accomplished intelligently, diplomatically, indeed multilaterally, could focus more usefully on Tunisia than on most points further east.

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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

How Israelis and Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of the Oslo Peace Process, ed. Tamara Cofman Wittes. Foreword by Richard H. Solomon. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005. xiv + 148 pages. Index to p. 160. $40 cloth; $14.95 paper.

Reviewed by Kevin Avruch

This volume is the seventh in a series published by the USIP Press devoted to analyzing the "national negotiating styles" of different countries. Unlike the others — which treat each style as standing on its own — this one considers Israeli and Palestinian styles as they emerge through time in the course of dyadic diplomatic encounters with each other. Indeed, this volume explores how these styles are in large part *shaped* by the dynamics of these encounters. In negotiation the "style" of one's interlocutor counts a lot in accounting for one's own.

This insight is developed in the two main chapters that make up this volume: Omar Dajani's on Palestinian negotiating styles and Aharon Klieman's on Israeli negotiating culture. Editor Tamara Wittes contributes a brief introductory chapter that sets the stage by reviewing earlier work in this vein and connecting it to the Palestinian-Israeli case. In a concluding chapter, Wittes reviews the contributors' findings, presents her case for conceptualizing culture as an "intervening variable" in intercultural negotiations, and offers some "lessons for negotiators" in protracted interethnic and intercultural conflicts.

William Quandt is the fourth contributor. His chapter reviews Palestinian-Israeli relations and negotiations historically. This chapter, concise and lucid, is helpful to readers who might be less familiar with the main events in the conflict and the peace process. Quandt's (admittedly cursory) treatment of culture in negotiation is less satisfying, even at odds with the more nuanced treatments by Dajani and Klieman that follow. Quandt places culture as a discrete variable beside, and in distinction to, other variables such as structure, power, or the nature of domestic support. Culture is reduced to attitudes or a weak synonym for identity. As a (complicating) factor in intercultural negotiations it reduces to some thing like "cultural sensitivities." Of course, these can be easily discounted (or dismissed as mere "atmospherics"), when compared to the hard and more material realities of structure or power.

In contrast, Dajani and Klieman present a more complex view of culture. The fractious institutional structures of Palestinian politics or the security-dominated political institutions of Israel are constituted, they argue, out of Palestinian and Israeli cultural narratives about history, the world, and especially each other. Structures and institutions do not sit beside culture: they are imbued with it. Culture here is not an abstract entity but something instantiated in negotiations by socially situated, flesh-and-blood negotiators (and the occasional third party). Klieman shows this in his description of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David II, torn between a dominant Israeli "security subculture" and a diplomatic one, each pulling in different directions — the former won out. Dajani (who served as a legal advisor to Palestinians in negotiations between 1999 and 2001) shows Palestinian narratives at work in the case of Yasir 'Arafat and others who served on Palestinian negotiating teams from Oslo (1993) onward. Each is sensitive to the way in which the weaknesses and flaws of the respective styles (the perceived impatience and arrogance of the Israelis; the perceived passivity, indecision, and disorganization of the Palestinians) reinforce the prejudices and fears of the other.

None of the authors argues that culture is an independent cause of this conflict or that cultural misunderstanding at the technical level of miscommunication is the obstacle that, if overcome, would magically

result in positive peace; and this reviewer agrees. The message of the book is that culture is pervasive and constitutive: that something like "power asymmetry" cannot be understood only in the abstract but concretely as it is experienced by Palestinians in the context of dispersion, dispossession, occupation, and exile — of "Catastrophe." And that Israeli concerns with security cannot be understood solely as a scalable "dilemma" but as a precipitate of Jewish history. Wittes, Dajani, and Klieman show how culture pervades and shapes Palestinian and Israeli negotiation encounters, in part by shaping perceptions of power imbalance, threat, and intentionality.

This is not so much a book about the cultural barriers that exist between Palestinians and Israelis, as it is about the *culture of Israeli and Palestinian negotiations* that has developed through time and successive encounters. This negotiation culture is what, in fact, Palestinians and Israelis *share*: they have co-created it. If nothing else, this work demonstrates how even shared culture is hardly enough for conflict resolution or peacemaking. On the contrary if, as Wittes, Dajani, and Klieman all assert, what is shared is something like a deep, abiding, and mutually exclusive commitment to one's own victimhood, a perduring existential insecurity, and a historical questioning of the legitimacy of the other, then what is shared is at the core of the dilemma of achieving peace.

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ARMENIANS

The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian Genocide, by Yair Auron. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2000. 332 pages. $29.95 paper.

The Banality of Denial: Israel and the Armenian Genocide, by Yair Auron. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 2003. 338 pages. $44.95.

Reviewed by Robert O. Krikorian

In August 1939, just days before the invasion of Poland, Hitler gathered together his generals to brief them on his plans for occupying the country. When questioned about the international reaction to the impending subjugation and destruction of Poland and its peoples, Hitler replied: "Who today, after all, speaks of the annihilation of the Armenians?" The quote, which can be seen in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, refers to the series of events, occurring from 1915 to 1923, known as the Armenian Genocide. Hitler thought that he had learned the lessons of history and, believing that the Armenian experience was indicative of Great Power indifference, felt that he would be able to act with impunity in carrying out the extermination of the Jews and others considered undesirable by Nazi racial theorists.

Like Hitler, the leaders of the Ottoman government and its ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), known generically as the Young Turks, used the cover of war to eliminate entire populations. In spring 1915, the Young Turk leaders in Constantinople relayed orders to Ottoman officials in the provinces to undertake the deportation of the Armenian population. Citing wartime exigencies, the Ottoman government claimed that these measures were necessary for the prevention of collaboration between the Ottoman Armenians and the invading Russians. The written orders for deportation were countermanded, however, by verbal orders carried to all party leaders by special emissaries stating that deportation meant extermination. The Armenian men had already been drafted into the Ottoman Army, which left the Armenian community without adequate protection. On the night of April 24, 1915, several hun-

dred leading members of the Armenian community were rounded up in Constantinople and sent off into exile and eventual death. This group included members of the Ottoman Parliament, writers, editors, artists, political activists and members of the clergy. Thus denied their leadership, the remaining Armenians were caught off-guard by the deportation orders. The deportees usually had no more than a few hours to prepare for the long trek and were able to take few of their belongings. In the end it did not matter, because very few of them reached their destination, which was to be northern Syria, a largely lifeless desert. En route, the convoys of Armenian deportees were attacked either by groups of Kurdish bandits, marched endlessly until they died of exhaustion, or murdered outright by Turkish gendarmes or soldiers. Although the exact number of Armenians killed during the Genocide may never be determined, it has been estimated that approximately 1.5 million Armenians were killed between 1915 and 1923.

For many years, the destruction of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was considered the forgotten genocide, and to this day it is largely a taboo subject in the Republic of Turkey, where a vociferous campaign of denial has been underway for decades. Outside of Turkey, however, this wall of silence is being gradually dismantled as increasing numbers of scholars publish their research findings on various aspects of the Armenian Genocide. Among the pioneers of such efforts is the Israeli scholar, Yair Auron, whose two books shed important light on the varying responses of Jews to the genocide of the Armenians. Borrowing the terminology of Hannah Arendt's *Banality of Evil*, Auron explores the impact of the Armenian Genocide on the Jews of the Ottoman Empire, especially those in Palestine (the Yishuv). He opens *The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian Genocide* with a theoretical discussion of the uniqueness of the Holocaust and the arguments for and against the comparative study of genocide. Without questioning the uniqueness of the Holocaust, Auron notes the unique nature of each instance of genocide and the importance of putting events in their proper historical context and of comparing them in order to come to a broader understanding.

Auron details the position of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire, especially those who resided in Palestine. Welcomed into the Ottoman Empire after their expulsion from Spain in 1492, Jews had a very different, and more positive, historical experience under Ottoman rule than Armenians and other Christians, and as immigration into Ottoman Palestine increased throughout the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the twentieth century, Ottoman goodwill for the Zionist enterprise was essential for its success. During the years of World War One, Palestine came under the jurisdiction of Cemal Pasha, Ottoman Minister of the Navy, commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army, and one of the leading figures of the CUP. Highly suspicious of the Jews and their aspirations, Cemal initiated severe measures against them, including an attempted deportation. He was dissuaded from this extreme course of action by pressure from German and American officials, who stressed the negative impact this would have on world public opinion, particularly world Jewry. These and other actions of the Ottomans led to a feeling of increased insecurity for the Jews of the Yishuv, which was exacerbated by their knowledge of what was happening to the Armenians.

Word of the destruction of the Armenians reached Palestine through various channels including several Jewish eyewitnesses to the atrocities. Fear that they would be the recipients of similar treatment led to various Jewish responses, which ranged from indifference to the plight of the Armenians to moral outrage and active assistance to the survivors. Some leading Zionists, including Chaim Weizman and Nahum Sokolov publicly spoke out against the treatment of the Armenians, as did many Jewish journalists and publicists, while others cautioned against openly antagonizing the Turks, lest they mete out a similar punishment to the Jews. After exhaustive research, Auron concludes that the response within the Yishuv

proper was muted, however, with little reference to and no condemnation of the extermination of the Armenians in Zionist publications, internal protocols or private letters. Some young idealistic Zionists, however, took a decidedly pro-active stance toward the ongoing destruction of the Armenians and attempted to aid them. This group, which formed the pro-British Jewish espionage ring, known as NILI, and led by Aaron Aaronsohn, was motivated to act, in part, out of a sense of outrage towards the treatment of the Armenians. It was eventually discovered and destroyed, and several of its leaders were executed.

One of the most profound and moving chapters in *The Banality of Indifference* is Auron's discussion of the impact of the Armenian Genocide on the Jews of Europe during the Holocaust. Awareness of the fate of the Armenians was largely the result of the novel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, written by the Viennese Jewish author Franz Werfel in 1933 in German and translated into Hebrew in 1934. The Nazis subsequently had the book banned. In the ghettoes of Nazi-occupied Europe, Jewish resistance fighters gained inspiration from reading the epic story of a small group of Armenians, who instead of submitting to massacre, retreated to a mountain stronghold and fought off Ottoman soldiers and irregulars until rescued by a French warship. According to Auron the example of Musa Dagh, with its emphasis on resistance, was more important to the Jewish resistance fighters than the symbolism of Masada, the *locus classicus* of Jewish martyrdom.

In *The Banality of Denial: Israel and the Armenian Genocide*, Auron next turns to Israeli official and unofficial attitudes to the issue of the Armenian Genocide. Auron's philosophical and moral approach to the question of Israel's attitude towards the Armenian Genocide is provided in the Preface, where he states unequivocally, "denying a committed genocide, or supporting directly or indirectly, the denial of the Armenian Genocide, the genocide of the Roma, or any other genocide, is factually wrong, a sin morally, and sometimes also a crime legally. In my opinion, it also betrays the legacy of the Holocaust, at least as I understand it. Unfortunately, my country, Israel, is committing this sin" (p. xiv).

Israeli responses are conditioned by several factors, including a strong feeling among various segments of society regarding the incomparability of the Holocaust with any other historical event, including the Armenian Genocide. He also analyzes two critical, but divergent, trains of thought that have developed in Israel in the wake of the Holocaust, namely the universalist attitude of "never again" versus the more particularist approach of "never again to us." The exclusivist mindset of the latter has been buttressed by the important strategic alliance between Israel and Turkey, which has waged a relentless campaign of historical distortion and denial. In Auron's opinion, Israel's relations with Turkey have come at the expense of Israel's acknowledging the historical truth of the Armenian Genocide and have compromised Israel's integrity. Auron also outlines Turkish pressure tactics against Israel with regard to the Armenian Genocide, using the example of Turkey's success in having Israel withdraw official sponsorship of a major Holocaust and Genocide conference in 1982, which was to include several papers on the Armenian Genocide. Turkey obliquely threatened the Jewish community in Turkey by claiming that it would not be able to guarantee their safety in the event of Israeli state sponsorship of the conference. Auron recounts numerous other instances of Turkish pressure on Israel, including various attempts over the years to co-opt Jewish American organizations in order to defeat pending pieces of legislation affirming the Armenian Genocide.

Auron also points out the notable exceptions to this general pattern of aiding the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide, particularly the behavior of an Israeli education minister, Yossi Sarid, who had the moral fortitude to attend an Armenian Genocide commemorative event in the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem, which took place on April 24, 2000. In his speech, Sarid remarked, "I join you, members of the Arme-

nian community, on your Memorial Day, as you mark the eighty-fifth anniversary of your genocide. I am here, with you, as a human being, as a Jew, as an Israeli, and as education minister of the State of Israel" (p. 297). Sarid's comments drew a heated reaction from the Turkish government. The author then discusses the important role of Israeli and Jewish academics in refuting Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide and in promoting awareness of this crime against humanity, noting the particular contributions of scholars such as Israel Charny and Yehuda Bauer.

The Banality of Denial also includes five appendices, which include the unanimous resolution on the Armenian Genocide passed by the Association of Genocide Scholars (AGS) of North America in 1997 as well as several statements by scholars and educators affirming the incontestable fact of the Armenian Genocide and urging Western democracies to recognize it as such. Auron's meticulous and methodologically rigorous research has resulted in two major contributions to our understanding of Jewish and Israeli responses to the Armenian Genocide. His moral courage in addressing sensitive issues that go to the very essence of Israeli national identity is to be commended. *The Banality of Indifference* and *The Banality of Denial* are groundbreaking works of scholarship and will soon become essential reading for students in a wide range of fields, including global politics, genocide studies, Zionism, and international ethics.

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EGYPT AND JORDAN

Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordan, by Nachman Tal. Brighton, UK and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. xi+245 pages. Notes to p. 265. Bibl. to 269. Index to p. 281. $29.95 paper.

Reviewed by Neil Quilliam

Tal has written a useful account of the rise of Islamic political movements in Jordan and Egypt throughout the 1990s. The book provides a wealth of data about the different Islamic groups residing and operating in both countries, and offers some insights into their different, and often competing, agendas. Moreover, Tal considers the different strategies employed by the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes in facing the challenge of indigenous Islamic parties. A number of sub-themes appear throughout the book, and include references to the socio-economic appeal of Islamic parties, the failure of secular ideologies, the national character of Islamic parties, and the enduring relationship between Islam, culture and political expression.

Although Tal seeks to understand the rise of radical Islam as a regional phenomenon, dating from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, he notes that the experience in each country is quite different and more often than not dependent upon the relationship between the regime and political Islam. Indeed, the author's own research on Egypt and Jordan highlights the differences more than the similarities between them. In other words, the challenge posed by the Islamist movement to the region's regimes is not monolithic, but country-specific.

Nevertheless, Tal uses a comparative approach to the subject matter and addresses four central themes: the relationship between the modern state and political Islam, the struggle between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, the rise of Islamic terrorism in the 1990s, and the regime's response to Islamic terrorism. The author explores these themes in two discrete sections of the book: Radical Islam in Egypt, and Radical Islam in Jordan.

Each section takes a broadly historical approach to the subject, and documents the evolution of the Islamic movement in both Jordan and Egypt. In doing so, Tal describes

the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the 1950s — both national and region-wide, and offers the reader a short typology of its more radical offshoots. Concomitantly, the author analyzes the response of both states to the threat posed by Islamic groups, and surmises that both have used a range of strategies including containment and confrontation. The utility of containment and confrontation, the author suggests, is dependent upon the levels of support enjoyed by the various Islamic groups, and the regime's recourse to Islamic legitimacy. King Husayn, for instance, was able to draw upon his lineage to Prophet Muhammad, as a way of muting the challenge of mainstream Islamic parties. President Husni Mubarak, on the other hand, is saddled with a secular ideology, which precludes him from using Islamic discourse to justify policy decisions. Hence, the policy of containment which was used in the aftermath of Anwar Sadat's death in 1981 was largely ineffective and short-lived. Tal argues that Mubarak's policy of confrontation has been a far more effective method of meeting the Islamist challenge and, to a large extent, has curtailed the threat. In Jordan, Kings Husayn and 'Abdullah have co-opted the mainstream Islamic parties into the democratic experience, whilst successfully marginalizing Islamic extremists.

Although the book is a difficult read at times and sometimes deviates from the main subject, it does provide a useful guide to the personalities, parties, and policies of the different Islamic groups in Jordan and Egypt. However, it does suffer from two flaws: first, it is written from a political-security perspective and, at times, lacks nuance; secondly, the author refers repeatedly to the superior organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamic parties, without ever explaining how that level of organization is achieved. It is a claim often repeated in the media, but one that seems rarely understood. Tal would have enhanced his study had he addressed such an issue.

Radical Islam provides an insightful account of the rise of Islamic movements in Jordan and Egypt since the 1950s, and the strategies used by the regimes to curtail their influence. By alluding to the examples of Sudan, Afghanistan, and Algeria, Tal asserts that the appeal of radical Islamist groups started to wane in the late 1990s, and the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes have developed proficient strategies to meet their challenge. Moreover, Islamic parties and their radical offshoots no longer constitute an existential threat to either state, although the secular policies of both states will always be at odds with their religious constituencies.

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LEBANON

Sabra and Shatila: September 1982, by Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout. London, UK and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004. xiv + 324 pages. Notes to p. 343. Appends. to p. 434. Bibl. to p. 462. $24.95 paper.

Reviewed by Joe Stork

The September 1982 massacre of more than a thousand Palestinian refugees and others in the Beirut outskirt settlements of Sabra and Shatila surfaced again as news in June 2001, when lawyers in Brussels filed a criminal complaint on behalf of 28 survivors and witnesses charging Ariel Sharon, retired Israeli Major General Amos Yaron, and several members of Lebanon's Phalangist Party militia with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The suit occasioned great controversy, though Sharon would have enjoyed immunity from possible prosecution as long as he remained Israel's head of state. The Belgian Supreme Court in March 2003 ruled the case admissible, under the Belgian law incorporating the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. But any criminal investigations and possible trials were foreclosed after an unrelated complaint was filed under the same law against

former US President George H.W. Bush on behalf of Iraqi victims of the bombing of a Baghdad bomb shelter in February 1991. In August 2003 Belgium, responding to US threats of "diplomatic consequences" such as the withdrawal of NATO headquarters from the country, revised its law to cover only cases in which the accused or the victim is Belgian or resided in the country at the time the alleged offense was carried out. The Sabra and Shatila complaint was dismissed.[1]

There are good reasons to question whether the victims of Sabra and Shatila will ever get their day in court, but this new book by Bayan Nuwahed al-Hout makes a powerful case. It serves as a monumental reminder that terrible things were done in those days, and that issues of accountability remain outstanding. The author writes 20 years later that she had no "comprehensive plan" when she started what became this book in late 1982, and that she initially began recording testimonies of families of victims and witnesses "for their own sake" (p. 4). Such a plan took shape only several years later, in 1985, well after it had become clear that the truth would not be available from the official (but secret) Lebanese report of late 1982 or Israel's Kahan Commission inquiry of February 1983, which held that Ariel Sharon bore "indirect" but "personal responsibility" but whose annex remains classified. A full account, in other words, would not be forthcoming from either of the official parties directly implicated in the slaughter. Al-Hout was determined, she writes now, to preserve first-hand testimonies and document the names of the victims, to disclose the identity of the perpetrators among the militias who carried out the slaughter, and to demonstrate that what occurred in those days of unspeakable horror was a massacre, not a lop-sided "battle" involving Palestinian fighters alleged to have remained when the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was evacuated to Tunis. (The author, it should be noted, is the wife of Shafiq al-Hout, then and for many years the PLO representative in Lebanon.) Her undertaking was conducting and recording the interviews, transcribing them, and then collecting the names of those who perished. In the end, she identified 906 persons who perished and 484 who disappeared and have never been found or accounted for.

The six chapters of Part One, "Testimonies and Accounts," comprise most of the book. After a short introductory chapter situating Lebanon's Palestinian population, the author utilizes the oral histories to narrate the Israeli army's encirclement of the districts on September 15, following the assassination of president-elect Bashir Gamayel the day before (chapter 2). Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are devoted to the events of September 16, 17, and 18, respectively. Chapter 6 recounts the observations of journalists and humanitarian workers who were the first to enter the death zone on the afternoon of that last day. Part Two includes an account of a "field study" (chapter 7) questionnaire carried out in the spring of 1984 that provided a breakdown of the victims by nationality (the victims included many Lebanese as well as a much smaller number of Syrians and Egyptians, in addition to the many Palestinians who perished),[2] gender, age, profession, and social standing. Chapter 8 describes how the numbers of victims were arrived at, and how the names were acquired. The final chapter asks: who was responsible? Appendix 1 consists of more than 15 tabulations derived from the 1984 questionnaire; Appendix 2 consists of the lists of names of those known to have been killed or "disappeared." Appendix 3 consists of photographs and maps.

Bayan al-Hout's book brings the victims of the massacre into the foreground, and will

1. For a discussion of the suit, see John Borneman, ed., *The Case of Ariel Sharon and the Fate of Universal Jurisdiction* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Institute for International and Regional Series, Monograph Series, Number 2, 2004).

2. See, on this point, Appendix 1, Table 2a, p. 344.

serve as a key reference of a major crime against humanity, a crime that has as yet seen no accounting in any court of law although the basic facts are not in serious dispute. She writes modestly in her introduction that "[t]his is not a definitive piece of research about Sabra and Shatila," adding that a complete picture of these events will be available only when the diaries and recollections of those who lived through it — militia members, soldiers and officers as well as victims and witnesses — are made public. Until then, however, any serious consideration of the dark days of September 1982 will be indebted to the author and to Pluto Press, the publisher.

Joe Stork is Washington director of the Middle East division of Human Rights Watch.

PALESTINE AND PALESTINIANS

Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland, by Juliane Hammer. Austin, TX; University of Texas Press, 2005. xiii + 225 pages. Appends. to p. 228. Notes to p. 238. Bibl. to p. 259. Index to p. 271. $55 cloth; $22.95 paper.

Reviewed by Barbara Aswad

The return of Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza areas of Occupied Palestine is a new phenomenon of the last decade since the Oslo Peace Accords (1993). Approximately 100,000 have returned, according to Dr. Hammer, and it is a segment of this population, young adults born in exile, upon which she has done an extremely valuable, insightful, and thorough anthropological ethnography.

The process of "right of return" is an important and complex issue for many reasons. It is part of the Palestinian struggle ever since the illegal acquisition and confiscation of lands by Israel in 1948, after the 1967 war, and through its continued expansion and land grabs. Return and compensation are both emotional and political aspects in the conflict over land, statehood, and international human rights. Hammer writes that the returnees have not included people from camps in surrounding Arab countries, but Palestinians who were working for the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and applied to return and work with the Palestinian Authority and/or the police forces; beneficiaries of family reunification programs; returnees from Kuwait, and Palestinians with foreign passports (p. 4).

Hammer chose to study 50 women and men between the ages of 16 and 35, who were born outside Palestine, and residing in the Ramallah/Jerusalem area. Her methodology includes in-depth interviews conducted primarily in Ramallah, and primarily in English. Additionally, the writer lived in the area and had valuable discussions with writers, politicians, scholars, and others between 1997 and 2000. Thus, she participated in activities that gave her knowledge and context for the cultural, religious, and political questions she investigated. Her sample is divided into the *'A'idin* (those born in other Arab countries) and *Amirkan* (those born in America), and each group is divided into voluntary and involuntary returnees.

The author discusses different forms of migration, such as forced and voluntary, as well as the emotions of exile and separation. For Palestinians, migration was a result of war, political persecution, economic pressure, and eviction of political activists (p. 15). A detailed history of dispossession provides a thorough background for this important case. There are several million not living in Occupied Palestine. Often, flight involved many moves, and although Palestine remained the foremost source of identity, many of those who fled also acquired new identities in order to adjust to their places of exile. These identities influence the ways they adjust to the Palestinian areas. Intermarriage with locals while in exile and gender become important factors, since only children of Palestinian fathers

are "proper Palestinians" (p. 17). Those with Palestinian mothers also show a strong sense of national identity.

Hammer relays stories of memory, which have accompanied the wrenching experience as told by parents to this younger generation. Memory often idealizes places or origin, and the exiles find it is not always the same when they return to a war-ravaged country of persons who have been struggling for their lives and resources. The writer skillfully weaves the returnees' expectations and their feeling of belonging or disappointments with these memories. Some had visited the area as children, so they are not surprised; others come for the first time.

An important part of the study relates to the acceptance by the locals of the two groups, neither of which is totally welcomed. The '*A'idin* are seen as often taking jobs and political positions. They are teased about their foreign Arabic accents, which distinguish them as "outsiders." Most *Amirkan* lack skills in Arabic, a big barrier to their integration; however they are received somewhat more favorably, because many are students and working with NGOs (non-governmental organizations), and consequently seem less threatening and perhaps more temporary. They come from economically successful families, and have more relatives locally who facilitate their acceptance. They can also travel around Palestine and Israel more freely. In contrast, '*A'idin*, who originated from different parts of Palestine, live in apartments, and are more restricted in their movements. *'A'idin* and *Amirkan* never formed one group.

The book also contains interesting discussions of the differences between the two groups' political involvement, and of the stereotypes with which each group has had to contend regarding cultural behavior, religious attitudes, dress, and leisure activities. Some women feel harassed and are the targets of gossip, as they are thought to be liberal. Finding spaces for leisure time activities is important for both genders. The crucial role of the two schools, Birzeit University and Friends Boys School, is also discussed. (It should be mentioned that Ramallah is not representative of all of Palestine, and that the returnees have contributed to its more cosmopolitan nature.)

A summary at the end of each chapter regarding the differences in each group, or a summary narrative of each group in the conclusion would have been useful. However, the historical and personal attitudinal information, as well as the scholarly analyses of identity, are invaluable.

In *Palestinians Born in Exile,* Juliane Hammer shows that the rewriting and the future of identities are told through diverse stories. Although Palestinian identity is only one of the identities of the subjects of her study, Hammer's analysis also shows that " Palestine as a symbolic, imagined, and real homeland is center to Palestinian self definitions" (p. 221). The dream of returning has turned into a reality for a considerable number, and a possibility for others.

Barbara Aswad, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Department of Anthropology, Wayne State University, is the co-editor of Family and Gender Among American Muslims *(Temple University Press, 1996).*

Occupied By Memory: The Intifada Generation and the Palestinian State of Emergency, by John Collins. New York and London, UK: New York University Press, 2004. xvi + 228 pages. Appendix to p. 233. Notes to p. 252. Gloss. to p. 254. Bibl. to p. 256. Index to p. 284. $60 cloth; $20 paper.

Reviewed by Glenn E. Robinson

In this fascinating ethnographic account, John Collins shows how Palestinians remember, re-shape, and reinvent in their popular imagination the first Intifada, or uprising, of 1987-1993. Collins undertook significant fieldwork in the Balata refugee camp near Nablus in the late 1990s to write this book, originally his Ph.D. dissertation. Balata is the largest and most densely populated refugee camp on the West Bank. Most of the book consists of relating and analyz-

ing various Intifada recollections mostly young Palestinians from Balata tell. Collins breaks down the memories into six types, or "rhetorical modes": tales of heroism, victimization, guilt/shame, potential (e.g., how demography will change the future), testimonial, and empowerment.

In his analysis, Collins fleshes out several insights. First, he shows vividly the "possibilities of memory," of how events from years earlier get remembered in certain ways that give meaning to the narrator and convey a moral story to the audience. In this way, Collins' work fits into both a long anthropological tradition and more contemporary discursive analyses. Memories are not static, but constitute a fluid reordering of the past to give meaning to the present.

Second, Collins shows how remembrances of the Intifada are "spatialized" (i.e., closely connected to specific physical sites). Spatial memories are also linked to the issue of home and generational authority. Where young activists often remembered having to play by traditional family rules inside the family home (even while they privately resisted generational authority), status outside the home was conferred not by age but by political and tactical talent. Many earlier analyses of the Intifada noted this same trend: the rejection of traditional authority by young activists. Collins shows not how or if this phenomenon was empirically true, but how it is remembered to be true and what lessons are drawn from that recollection as part of the ongoing construction of the Palestinian national narrative.

Further, Collins closely ties the construction of memory to ideas of generational change in the dominant Palestinian narrative. The Intifada generation (*jil al-intifada*) followed the *jil al-thawra* (the revolutionary generation of the 1960s and early 1970s that created the PLO), which itself followed the *jil al-nakba* — the generation of the "catastrophe" of 1948. Being a member of the Intifada generation gave participants both a meaningful place of belonging and a sense of rebellion. That is, this generation belonged to an unbroken generational chain that constitutes the Palestinian national narrative, but at the same time sets them apart as a generation of rebellion against the established order, both Israeli and Palestinian.

Collins concludes with a discussion of how the Oslo peace process — of which he is a strong critic — tended to fragment the Intifada generation, and that fragmentation can be seen in the evolving memories of the possibilities of the first uprising. Indeed, Collins argues that Palestinians are in a "permanent state of emergency," a condition that profoundly impacts how Palestinians remember and make sense of their past and future.

While absorbing to read, Collins' book does not fit easily into typical course syllabi, excepting a focused course on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Scholars interested in the politics of memory will benefit from reading this well-written book, as will historians of the Balata-Nablus region of the West Bank. Courses on revolutionary change — and, especially, how the revolutionary moment gets remembered and reinvented — will also benefit from including this work.

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SYRIA

Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire, by Flynt Leverett. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. xiii + 167 pages. Appends to p. 214. Notes to p. 275. $27.95.

Reviewed by Raymond Hinnebusch

This book is valuable for its account of Syria under Bashar al-Asad but especially for its insights into the US policy process and the divisions within the US foreign policy establishment. Flynt Leverett, a former senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expert on Syria and later responsible for Syria on the State Department Policy

Planning Staff, resigned in disagreement with the Bush administration's policy toward that country. His views could fairly be considered representative of the mainstream foreign policy community marginalized since the rise of the extreme hawks (Vice President Richard Cheney/Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) and neo-cons around Bush. Since the book is published under the patronage of Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution's Saban Center, its views are presumably compatible with the moderate wing of Zionism as well.

Leverett shows how disagreements within the US government over how to deal with Syria correlate to different views of Bashar al-Asad. One tendency sees him as a malign protector of an obsolete status quo, another as merely incompetent, while a third sees him as a reformer. By Leverett's reading of the evidence, Bashar is a reformer who is, however, constrained by the power structure within which he must operate. He is pulled by conflicting needs to be true to his father's foreign policy legacy yet to adapt to the much less favorable strategic environment Syria now faces. His reformist ambitions can be seen in his abandoning of Ba'thist ideology, his attempt to build an "alternative" power center of Westernized liberals within the regime, and from the reforms in education, banking, and administration by which he seeks to prepare the long-term grounds for change. But Bashar lacks an elaborated blueprint to guide him and is constrained by the risks of going too fast — provoking enemies, or regime collapse a la former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Thus, he does not directly attack the financial interests of crony capitalists but has, instead, pursued a European Union (EU) Association Agreement as a tool to force indirectly the pace of reform against domestic resistance (pp. 84-85); (ironically key EU states, partly to appease Washington, have blocked this agreement, the very measure that would consolidate the reformist trend in Syria).

US Middle East policy, Leverett observes, has two main thrusts: to promote stability (presumably crucial to access to oil at reasonable prices) and to allow Israel to maintain its hegemonic position (pp. 6-7). Though Leverett does not draw the conclusion, these policy aims build a deep-seated contradiction into US Middle East policy that correlates to a profound ambivalence toward Syria. This is reflected in the fluctuations in US policy between trying to engage Syria in the peace process and trying to isolate it. Insofar as the United States has made Middle East stability a higher priority than Israeli hegemony, it has engaged Syria. Except under President Ronald Reagan (1981-88), US administrations since that of Richard Nixon (1969-75) have seen Syria as a pivotal country where outcomes have wide regional implications. A Syrian-Israel peace was seen as decisively bolstering the forces of moderation in the region while completing the "circle of peace" around Israel (p. 9). Outstanding issues of contention between the United States and Syria (e.g., terrorism, weapons of mass destruction) were thought to be resolvable within the framework of a Syrian-Israeli settlement. Syria had engaged in the peace process and in the 1990s Syria and Israel came very close to peace. Leverett observes that the peace process failed because Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001) was unwilling to endorse the "Rabin deposit" (p. 47) of total withdrawal from the Golan Heights in return for security and normalization arrangements; when President Bill Clinton failed to hold Barak to Israel's commitments while misleading Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad that he would, the peace process collapsed at Geneva in 2000 (pp. 47-8).

It was always possible that once the peace process failed Israel's hegemonic interests would eclipse regional stability as the driving force in US Middle East policy and with the election of George W. Bush in 2000 this happened. Although Leverett does not explicitly make this claim, he does note that the neo-cons brought to power by Bush (e.g., Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, David Wurmser) had previously advised Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (1996-99) to use force against Syria; Wurmser, he observes, made the Office of Secretary of

Defense an advocate for regime change. This faction would get the upper hand over resistance by the official moderates for a number of reasons. US-Syria relations deteriorated over Syrian violation of UN sanctions over the Iraq pipeline. Leverett claims that Secretary of State Colin Powell misunderstood Bashar to promise to put the pipeline under UN auspices; US diplomats attending the meeting seemingly failed to correct this; and Powell thereafter claimed to believe Bashar had lied to him, undermining support in the State Department for engaging with Syria (more likely Powell was unwilling to acknowledge that he had been fooled). After 9/11, Syria, keen to appease the United States, provided valuable intelligence against al-Qaida, but the neo-cons and Rumsfeld/Cheney opposed any cooperation, which they saw as rewarding Syria for its bad behavior — that is, its support of Hizbullah and Palestinian rejectionist factions which Damascus saw as its last remaining cards to get Israel back to the negotiating table. With the United States offering Bashar no carrots to substitute for its economic partnership with Iraq and with Damascus fearful of a hostile US military presence on its Eastern flank, Bashar fatefully decided to oppose the Iraq invasion and, when it became inevitable, opted, albeit half-heartedly, to transfer some armaments to Saddam and to facilitate the flow of resistance fighters across the border in the hope the United States would become too bogged down in Iraq to threaten Syria. Nevertheless, Bashar was always ready for a deal, Leverett implies, if only Washington was prepared to engage rather than merely threaten. There was, in fact, a division among US officials over post-invasion policy toward Syria: the generals on the ground tried to pursue pragmatic deals that would help pacify the Syrian-Iraqi border but were stepped on by their Pentagon bosses (pp. 138-39); in December 2004, while the US military in Iraq was reporting serious new Syrian efforts to control the border (e.g., new checkpoints, arrests of militants), Rumsfeld was charging that Syrian meddling in Iraq was "killing Americans" (p. 140).

Under Bush, Leverett tells us, US policy is not to offer inducements to "rogue states" to change their behavior. Hence, the only policy option is simply to increase pressure, threats, and sanctions. There is little doubt Washington has been able to make life very difficult for Bashar. Leverett notes that the neo-con/Cheney-Rumsfeld axis saw Lebanon as a pressure point against Syria from the beginning of Bush's tenure (p. 144) and, of course, they were able to achieve a notable success there. Pro-Zionist US Congressmen are proposing a Syrian Liberation Act to fund exiles and, in particular, to play "the Kurdish card" against Damascus. Leverett points to the potential high costs of de-stabilizing Syria and argues that US objectives could be achieved at less cost by engaging Bashar whose only condition is that there must be a dialogue. The dominant Washington view, however, is that US demands must simply be accepted unconditionally.

This book is a competent analysis of Syria and its relations with the United States. It is marked by an empathy (here meaning the ability to put yourself in the shoes of an opponent) that is in very short supply in a Washington that seems to have fatally contracted "imperial hubris." Leverett's measured analysis (along with the inside accounts of other moderates) gives hope that the voices of reason may yet prevail in the corridors of Washington power.

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A New Old Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria, by Christa Salamandra. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004. xi + 164 pages. Notes to 171. Refs. to 187. Index to 199. $49.95 cloth; $21.95 paper.

Reviewed by Anne Bennett

This ethnography focuses on the typically overlooked (at least in the anthropological literature) elite classes of the con-

temporary Middle East. In this case, the analysis focuses on the wide variety of contexts in which both the *nouveau riche* and the upper crust old families of Damascus pursue and display status and prestige in an effort at establishing a quintessentially Damascene identity. *A New Old Damascus* is a refreshing addition to the ethnography of the Middle East in that it eschews anthropology's more typical focus on the exotic and the marginal, and it offers up an analysis of intense identity management rich in voices, telling details, and theoretical engagement. Its sites of ethnography include the burgeoning leisure options that have expanded in Damascus in the past 15 years, including restaurants, cafes, clubs, and hotels in the Old City, as well as in the upscale neighborhoods scattered around Damascus. There is also a great deal of attention paid to the widely watched and commented upon nostalgic television serials that are offered up during the month of Ramadan. Additionally, those who are identified with the conservation, preservation, and celebration of Damascus, including novelists, philosophers, and government ministers, are among those whose voices appear woven into the analysis.

Salamandra reports that in this elite social milieu one among many routes to pursuing distinction, authenticity, and Damascene identity involves the commodification of Ramadan and what Salamandra terms "ostentatious fasting" (p. 96). Ostentatious fasting is followed toward the latter half of Ramadan by elaborate fast-breaking *iftar*'s and associated evenings of sociability at public sites of consumption and leisure across the city. The commodification of Ramadan is framed in her analysis as a reinvented tradition. This seems a gutsy choice, focusing on conspicuous consumption among the elite during the holy month of Ramadan (and one that Salamandra's cosmopolitan elite Syrian readers might not be inclined to accept). Salamandra's take on Ramadan's *iftar*, *suhur*, and television serials, however, are an integral and convincing part of her larger analysis of the pursuit of authenticity and distinction in the construction of Damascene identity.

Perhaps the most fascinating chapter, in terms of ethnographic detail, theoretical engagement, and disciplinary upbraiding, is the one focusing on the intersection of consumption, display, and gender. Here Salamandra takes anthropology to task for presenting women's worlds in the Middle East as characterized overwhelmingly by mutual support and harmony in contexts of intense sociability. It may be intensely social, but in the Damascene context of the privileged upper classes, the dominant tenor is one of relentlessly fierce competitiveness and unforgiving scrutiny, particularly among women. This competitive sociability among the elite women of Damascus is described by Salamandra as agonistic. She effectively draws on analyses of men's competitive social worlds proffered by ethnologists Michael Herzfeld (with respect to Greece) and Michael Gilsenan (with respect to Lebanon) to put forward an agonistic model of women's competitive sociability. Also Salamandra somewhat reluctantly (but confidently nonetheless) reminds her readers of an earlier era in Middle East ethnography that posited a Mediterranean culture area which, she points out, may have some relevance in terms of recognizing the forces at work in contexts of intense agonistic competition and sociability. In her extended discussion of anthropology's treatment of women in the Middle East, she accuses scholars of accommodating a politically correct post-Orientalist stance whereby the less-than-flattering ways that people often vie for status and prestige are presented with a culturally relative good face, when in fact the reality can be rather ruthless and undercutting.

Salamandra draws on many theoretical perspectives in discussing the pursuit authenticity and distinction in Damascus. At one point she describes her work as "an urban geography of social distinction" (p. 41). Included in the body of the text are 21 well-chosen photographs and a "map of Damascus indicating degrees of wealth in elite neighborhoods" (p. 42). This reader wishes the author had included more maps indicating the locations of scores of places

referred to in the text, perhaps on a chapter by chapter basis. Save for this minor qualification, *A New Old Damascus* is an important contribution to the ethnography of the Middle East that offers a fresh perspective both in terms of topic and analytical approach, a wide range of theoretical engagement, and fascinating ethnographic examples.

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TURKEY

Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change, by Meliha Benli Altunik and Özlem Tür. London, UK and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005. xvii + 139 pages. Map. Tables. Chron. Notes to p. 163. Bibl. to p. 170. Index to p. 174. $18.99 paper.

Reviewed by Omer Taspinar

In a succinct and highly readable book, Meliha Benli Altunik and Özlem Tür have produced the best overview of modern Turkish history since Erik Zürcher's *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993).

In an excellent chapter on history, the most important contribution of the book is the emphasis on continuity between Ottoman reformism and the foundational decades of the Turkish Republic. In doing so, the authors manage to avoid the common mistake of analyzing the Kemalist reforms as a radical departure from Ottoman social engineering. Parallels between Ottoman and Republican patterns of state-religion relations, as well as certain similarities between the Ottoman millet system and Republican concepts of minorities and citizenship are also analyzed in a similar vein.

Far from considering Turkey a textbook example of modernization theory, or a model to be emulated by the Arab world, the book realistically analyzes the problematic dimension of Turkish modernization. Authoritarian proclivities and elitist nation-building are indeed two aspects of Kemalism that continue to have an impact on modern Turkish politics. Not surprisingly, these negative aspects of Turkey's political tradition became more discernible with the rise of domestic "identity politics" in the wake of the 1980 military take-over. As Kurdish and Islamic dissidents began to challenge Turkey's Kemalist identity in the post-Cold War era, the elitist and authoritarian trend went from bad to worse.

In that sense, the authors correctly identify the Kurdish problem and political Islam as the twin threats to the official ideology of Kemalism. Of course, neither Kurdish nationalism nor political Islam is, in the strictest sense, a "new" challenge for the Turkish Republic. There is, in fact, an intriguing continuity between the societal and political cleavages of the foundational decades of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s, and the cleavages that polarized Turkish society in the1980s and 1990s. Surprisingly, the book fails to emphasize explicitly this continuity of Kurdish and Islamic dissent in modern Turkish history.

It is very interesting that Turkey managed to avoid an identity-based polarization along Kurdish and Islamic lines during the Cold War interlude. In fact, the ideological polarization that the country witnessed between 1950 and 1980 masked the domestic identity problems of the Kemalist Republic that were rooted in a form of nation-building that suppressed the Kurdish and Islamic identity of Anatolia. It is no coincidence that the Anatolian periphery had responded to secularist and Turkish nation-building with more than a dozen Kurdish-Islamic rebellions between 1925 and 1938.

As the Cold War started and the domestic transition to multiparty politics was successfully achieved, the situation changed. Kurdish and Islamic dissent did not disappear but gained political and ideological colorings within rightwing and leftwing movements. It is in this Cold War context

that Kurdish dissent came to be absorbed by the radical left, while political Islam managed to find a home within the anti-communist right. As such, the Kemalist Republic managed to postpone the day of reckoning when Kurdish dissent re-emerged in the mid-1980s in the form of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and political Islam gained unprecedented visibility in the 1990s with victories in municipal elections.

Such a difficult domestic context also shaped Turkey's problematic external relations with its neighbors and with the European Union (EU). As the EU began its expansion to Central and Eastern Europe, the authors rightly argue that "domestic weaknesses increased Turkey's vulnerabilities and thus undermined its capability to fully exploit opportunities" (p.138).

The last chapter of the book, which deals exclusively with Turkish foreign policy, points out that the positive turn of events with the European Union in 1999 became a major catalyst for Turkey's recent progress towards liberal democracy. It is indeed after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 putting Turkey back on track for full EU membership that Turkish reformers began to push harder for civilian control over the military and adherence to human and minority rights standards. One can add that it is the same democratic process that allowed a moderately Islamic party to come to power in 2002 and push even harder for liberal reforms.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival, by Christopher M. Davidson. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005. xi + 300 pages. Tables and figures. Gloss. to p. 306. Abbrevs. to p. 308. Bibl. to p. 326. Index to p. 332. $59.95.

Reviewed by Christian Koch

With all the crisis situations to its name, the Gulf region has received increased press attention over recent years. This has not all been negative; countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — and especially one if its constituent emirates, Dubai — have emerged as so-called economic wonders where neighboring conflicts have had little impact on corresponding growth and development. At the same time, the volume of focused academic literature with regard to the entire lower Gulf region (not only the UAE, but also Bahrain, Oman and Qatar) has remained relatively scant, with the majority of writings taking as their point of departure recent debates about democratization and the shortcomings of liberalizing tendencies in the Middle East societies. This, however, has provided little new insight into the workings of these states, particularly in light of the fact that given their present development, they have at times been referred to as model societies for the rest of the Middle East region.

The work by Christopher Davidson, an assistant professor of political science and area studies at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, entitled *The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival*, is thus a welcome addition to the existing literature and one that will lead to an increased understanding of how this society functions. The fact the UAE has survived as a federal entity (at the time of its establishment in 1971, the federation was given little chance of survival) makes the country a particularly interesting case study, although one has to question whether the characterization as a model character is applicable. But given its current thriving status and bright prospects, the UAE is definitely worth looking at more closely.

Davidson makes it clear at the very beginning that " … the purpose of this book is not only to consider the UAE's significant socioeconomic achievements and the survival of its seemingly anachronistic political structures, but also to provide a greater understanding of some of the key pathologies that have persistently undermined the

development objectives of the nascent state" (p. 1). To a large degree, the author is successful in fulfilling this criteria: what one is left with after reading the book is a broad understanding of how the primary traditional structures that defined the trucial coast states have not only laid "important antecedents of the current order" (p. 5), but have also undergone a "subtle evolution" (p. 65) to maintain their legitimacy and relevance over time. What is particularly valuable is that the author repeatedly shows how the UAE is quite distinct in its ruling arrangements, thereby underscoring that the Gulf States as such do not represent a monolithic or homogenous unit. This is a key point to remember, especially given the current debate about political reform and democratization.

The book's strengths are evident in the first two chapters, where the author provides a coherent overview as to how the UAE's polity and its traditional monarchies have managed to circumvent the dilemma faced by any ruling monarch in terms of being able to combine the necessity for reform, the demands of modernization, and the determination to maintain their own rule. Of equal importance is the author's characterization of the UAE as a loose confederation, rather than a tightly structured federation, an argument that is well substantiated in his treatment of the economic and domestic policies that defined the growth of the UAE throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. Yet, the author also makes a very convincing case that the *rentier* economy, while providing great wealth and allowing for social growth and engendering stability "has either created or done little to curb long-term developments problems" (p. 187). As such, the UAE is not only a study in survival, but also an experiment continuously in the making.

However, the book does have a few shortcomings. Sections of the work are very descriptive and predicated on numbers rather than on the qualitative aspect (e.g., discussions on education, pp. 140-43). In addition, the author's observations and analysis concerning the political development of the UAE are too generalized to comprehend fully the current state of debate or to lead to any particular new insight. In terms of his handling of the issue of civil society, for example, Davidson argues that, given present conditions, "any significant growth of autonomous civil society in the UAE will remain a distant prospect." Yet, there is enough evidence to suggest that the UAE, like the rest of the Gulf countries, has indeed embarked on a path of economic and political modernization in which civil society is playing an increasingly important role. In the first few months of 2005 alone, journalists have pressed for a bicameral federal council; leading academics have criticized openly the fact that the legislature is appointed, calling this "unacceptable"; and the media have focused attention on domestic issues such as labor disputes and the lack of coordination between municipality and local departments. The author offers no convincing evidence to support his suggestion that the large number of expatriates acts as a barrier to civil society's full development.

Despite the need for greater differentiation, the book under review still represents a welcome contribution to the field and a timely addition to the present debate. Alongside such classic works as Frauke Heard Bey's *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, Davidson's work has added to the required knowledge at a critical period of time.

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YEMEN

Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia 1962-1967, by Jonathan Walker. Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount Limited, 2005. xx + 300 pages. Gloss. to p. 305. Bibl. to p. 318. Index to p. 332. BP25.

Reviewed by Spencer Mawby

The publicity for this book makes comparisons between the current fighting in Iraq and the war that the British fought 40 years ago in Aden and its hinterland, which is now

part of the modern, united state of Yemen. Such parallels are not explored in the book itself, but it is a notable fact that Britain, unlike the United States, has long experience of counter-insurgency campaigns in the Middle East, most notably in Iraq and Palestine during the inter-war period and in Cyprus and Aden after 1945. These campaigns produced mixed results and the conflict with the National Liberation Front (NLF) and other insurgents in the town of Aden and the surrounding Protectorates was the least successful of these "small wars." It ended in 1967 with British military withdrawal, the defeat of her local allies and the establishment of a Marxist republic in South Yemen. The superficial similarities with events in Indochina have in the past produced another set of rather fanciful comparisons, with the Vietnam conflict rather than the most recent Iraq war.

Walker modifies this picture of military failure by providing very effective descriptions of the courage of individual British soldiers and political officers in what were essentially three separate but related conflicts. The oldest of these dated back to the 1920s, when the British began their campaigns of pacification against the tribes in the Aden Protectorates. In many respects, the Radfan campaign of 1964, which Walker describes in detail, was a continuation of these earlier confrontations, although the tribes were now ostensibly fighting for Arab unity rather than tribal independence. In the 1950s a second conflict broke out with the urban labor force in the town of Aden, who sought redress for their political and economic grievances, initially through industrial action and later through political violence on the streets. Finally, from 1962 the British played a covert role in the Yemen Civil War by offering various forms of assistance to the opponents of the Republican and Egyptian forces, including as Walker notes, the planting of anti-tank mines inside Yemen's frontiers (p. 87). The book includes illuminating firsthand testimony of what these events felt like to those who were involved on the ground, whether a signaller attempting to airlift fire engines around the Protectorates (p. 211) or the wife of a British diplomat in Yemen subduing a knife attacker in Taizz (p. 41).

In offering an explanation for British failure amidst individual heroism, Walker stresses the damage caused by the vacillations of metropolitan policy-makers. This is not a new interpretation: since the former Aden High Commissioner, Kennedy Trevaskis, published his indictment of Whitehall indecision, *Shades of Amber* in 1968, a substantial literature has emerged accusing the British government of betraying their allies in Aden. Walker is more nuanced in his approach, and during the course of the book, he implicitly suggests a list of other contributory factors behind the British failure which will be familiar to students of other counter-insurgency campaigns: lack of intelligence, under-funding for economic development programs and the existence of external support for the insurgents. Nevertheless, lack of political will features most prominently. Walker suggests at the outset that "political ineptitude" (p. xix) played a key role in determining the outcome, and identifies the Wilson government's refusal to offer a defense treaty to any future government as a "devastating" (p. 166) blow to the hopes of Britain's allies in the region. However, a case could be made for the contrary view that it was actually the excess will of Conservative ministers to maintain Aden as a British possession for as long as possible, rather than the decision of their Labour successors to withdraw a decade after Suez, which facilitated the eventual triumph of the NLF.

The other notable feature of the existing literature on Britain's Aden policy is the problems many authors have had delineating a very complex picture. Here Walker does a great service by providing by far the most accurate account of key events such as the Radfan campaign of 1964 and the mutiny of 1967. To achieve this, he has drawn both on official documentation and on the memoirs and oral testimony of numerous British officials. Although the archives of the Arab World Documentation Unit are used to good effect to provide the

contemporary views of the nationalist opposition, the discussion of the Arab side of events is somewhat sketchier than the British. In his coverage of Britain's punitive campaigns in the Protectorates and street fighting in Aden, Walker is more likely to describe the effects of terrorist bombs and grenades in Aden than that of an Royal Air Force (RAF) rocket attack on a camel train in the Protectorates. This should not detract from his achievement in providing a memorable account of the British experience of the end of empire in Aden. Hopefully, this book will be sufficiently widely read to spark new writing on the Aden campaign and thus, in turn, provide new perspectives on this neglected piece of 20th century British and Middle Eastern history.

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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Energy Developments in the Middle East, by Anthony H. Cordesman. Westport, CT and London, UK: Praeger Publishers, in cooperation with the Center for Strategic International Studies, Washington, DC, 2004. xvii + 287 pages. Notes to p. 298. Index to p.308. $55.

Reviewed by Gawdat Bahgat

This work is a welcome contribution to the growing literature on energy and the Middle East. The volume is an historical, economic, and geopolitical analysis, laden with numerous charts and tables, of the hydrocarbon resources of the Middle East.

One of the most important contributions Cordesman makes in this book is the distinction he draws between direct and indirect dependence. The US reliance on imported oil from the Middle East (i.e., direct dependence) is well established and has been extensively analyzed by many scholars and policy-makers. In contrast, American and global need for large amounts of manufactured goods from Asia and other nations which, themselves, are dependent on Middle East oil (i.e., indirect oil dependence) has not received much attention. Based on this distinction, one can argue that the United States and China (since, 2003, the world's second largest oil consumer after the United States) are not engaged in competition over energy resources in the Middle East and elsewhere to meet their growing demand. In other words, energy policy should not be seen in zero-sum terms. Rather, the continuing expansion of the Chinese economy would benefit American consumers.

To Cordesman's credit, he makes extensive use of what are widely regarded as top sources of information on the global energy market: the Energy Information Administration of the US Department of Energy, British Petroleum, *Middle East Economic Survey*, and *Middle East Economic Digest*.

Cordesman agrees with the conventional wisdom that the Middle East has been, and will continue to be, a critical factor in meeting global demand of oil and gas. He underscores the fact that given the global oil market is well integrated, the source of supplies is less important than the availability of enough oil in the market. Accordingly, even if the United States does not buy a single barrel of oil from the Middle East, the region will continue to have a tremendous impact on American and global markets.

Whereas most analysts of the Middle East's hydrocarbon resources focus on oil, refreshingly, Cordesman gives considerable attention and analysis to the region's potential significant role as natural gas producer and exporter. Another welcome aspect of this work is that it situates the analysis of energy issues (i.e., supply, demand, production, consumption, and reserves) in a broader socio-economic and political context, examining issues in education, unemployment, foreign investment and political succession.

Cordesman discusses the Middle East on both the region-wide and country levels. He provides energy profiles and outlooks for 15 Middle Eastern countries, including Israel (about which very little work

had heretofore been published).

Cordesman's study has few shortcomings. However, there are three worth mentioning. First, the book does not give enough attention to terrorist threats to energy infrastructure, particularly in Saudi Arabia. For several years, there have been some serious attacks on and threats against oil installations in Saudi Arabia. In response, Saudi authorities have taken several measures to strengthen and improve the security of pipelines and other energy installations. Some of these measures were made public.

Second, for the most part Cordesman gives a very bleak assessment of the current economic and political environment in the Middle East. He writes that "the region is scarcely without hope" (p.108), and that "most countries do not have public long-term energy plans" (p.156). Some experts would strongly disagree with this assessment. True, the region faces tremendous serious challenges, but there are high expectations among different segments of the population and in different countries. Furthermore, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Qatar (among others) either have implemented or are articulating long-term energy plans.

Finally, the work lacks references to rivalry and/or cooperation with other energy-rich regions such as Russia and the other Caspian Sea littoral states. For years, Middle East producers have conducted a dialogue with other producers to coordinate their common interests and energy policies. It would be useful to learn more about the dialogue, including what fruit, if any, it has yielded.

Despite these few shortcomings, the book is a treasure trove of information and data, and a cogent analysis of the energy resources of the Middle East — a valuable tool for both students of energy and specialists in the oil and natural gas industry.

Gawdat Bahgat, Director of Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, is the author of American Oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea *(2003).*

MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945, ed. by Wolfgang G. Schwanitz. Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner Publishers, 2004, 243 pages. Maps, figures, and documents. About the authors. $89.95.

Reviewed by Martin Kröger

Will the Middle East be the key political region of the 21st Century? The historian, of course, cannot answer this question authoritatively. Nevertheless, in preparing for such an eventuality, the historian *can* supply basic knowledge about the past, and thus help lay the basis for a far-sighted policy. The anthology published by Wolfgang G. Schwanitz offers valuable insights about the past. It informs readers about the meaning the Orient had as a derivative of intra-European politics from the establishment of the German Reich up to the end of the Second World War.

The "Eastern Question" was a substantial diplomatic constant of the 19th Century. During the 1830s, the European powers made the Middle East a component of the equilibrium among themselves. In the Paris peace treaty of 1856, they internationalized the Eastern Question. Thereafter, any modification of the condition of the exhausted Ottoman Empire required the approval of all of the Great Powers. Within this framework, German Chancellor Count Otto von Bismarck saw the German interests in the preservation of the tensions: other powers, but not the young German Reich, should bind their forces at the edge of Europe and behind.

In a short introduction, Schwanitz describes the development and transformation of the German Oriental Policy until 1945. He recalls the cultural relations of the "German Orient founding years," the German military mission in Turkey, and the economic engagement (notably, the construction of the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad). Not

for the first time Schwanitz characterizes the German attempts to provoke rebellions in the colonial back area of their war enemies 1914-18 as a "Jihad made in Germany." After the defeat, Germany lost its influence in the Middle East. For Adolf Hitler, the Middle East had meaning only as a possible battleground. The attempt of Arab nationalists to play the Italian-German card against British and French colonial rule changed nothing. In the conditions of the Cold War, an independant German Middle Eastern policy never recovered its priority. Schwanitz argues that, in the future, Germany has to develop a genuine role in Middle Eastern peace politics.

The seven studies comprising the anthology discuss specific aspects of the German *Orientpolitik* and its personnel. Thomas L. Hughes' contribution on the German mission 1915-1916 to Afghanistan summarizes this well-known episode. However, the work of Renate Vogel (e.g., *Die Persien-und Afghanistanexpedition Oskar Ritter von Niedermayers 1915/1916*, Osnabrüück, 1976) is not consulted. Hans Ulrich Seidt's biography of Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, who led the first German mission in Afghanistan (*Berlin, Kabul, Oskau,* 2002) is merely tacked on to the notes.

Seidt's own contribution to this volume describes the German attempts to take advantage of the unstable Middle Eastern situation after the First World War. For this objective, the Reichswehr secretly cooperated with Enver Pasha and the Young Turks, even with the communist leaders in Moscow. Wolfgang Schwanitz can only raise the interesting biography of the diplomat Fritz Grobba. He rightly wishes a longer representation of this effective expert, who was first in Ribbentrop's diplomatic service, then advisor to the Americans. Still, in the 1950s he applied to the German Foreign Office as a Middle East expert.

After the First World War, Germany did not find the way back to active politics in the Middle East. Using Saudi Arabia as an example, Uwe Pfullmann shows how Germany's conduct, which focused entirely on economic interests, was determined mainly in terms of the rivalry with Great Britain.

In a study of the reciprocal effects of German politics and research on oriental antiquity, Stefan R. Hauser highlights a distinctively German phenomenon. He shows that antiquity research and archaeology could only exist because of the exceptional interest that leading politicians had and could only survive through public financing. In reverse, the National Socialists later used this proximity of scholarship to power for their racist propaganda. Hauser states that the antiquity sciences no longer have proximity to power, and that the public reacts sensibly to orientalistic simplifications like Samuel Huntington's "clash-of-civilizations" concept.

Karl Heinz Roth's study describes a period in the life and career of Franz von Papen, a subject that has not been thoroughly examined. From 1939 to 1944 Papen was German Ambassador in Ankara. The author shows him as Hitler's willing diplomatic tool in the Orient. However, this account is not completely convincing because Roth overrates Papen's ambition and abilities.

In the last contribution, Gerhard Hoepp reminds readers of the Arab inmates in German concentration camps. Apart from, and in addition to, the breadth of Hoepp's research on the collaboration of Arab politicians with Germany, he helps ensure that those Arabs who were the victims of the Nazi genocide are not forgotten.

With this anthology, editor Wolfgang G. Schwanitz and the contributors to this volume present a competent overview of German Middle Eastern policy. Schwanitz's declared aim in producing this anthology is to stimulate further research. Without doubt, the book will succeed in doing so.

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The Turks in World History, by Carter Vaughn Findley. Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. xvi + 237 pages. Notes to p. 261. Bibl to p. 285. Index to p. 300. $74 cloth; $19.95 paper.

Reviewed by Mark L. Stein

In his latest book, Carter Vaughn Findley traces the history of the Turkic peoples from their origins on the Eurasian steppe to the modern era in which the Turkic world includes states in Central Asia, the Middle East, and a global diaspora. Arguing against the too-common view of a clash of essentialized civilizations, Findley presents the Turks as a group who successfully moved across civilizational boundaries, at the same time adapting to new conditions and maintaining their identity. Working chronologically, Findley first discusses the pre-Islamic Turks and their predecessors, and then addresses the transformations wrought by the Turks' encounters first with Islam and then with modernity.

The book is wide in scope, looking at the Turkic peoples across all of Eurasia from Anatolia to Xinjiang. This is a plus, as often discussions of Turkic history are dominated by coverage of the Ottoman Empire. Findley gives equal time to Turkic states and peoples in Central Asia as well. By placing his study of the Turks within the larger framework of world history, Findley admirably shows the significant role they played all across Eurasia.

The greatest strength of the book is Findley's chapters on the 19th and 20th centuries. Findley skillfully elucidates developments in the Turkic world in the face of European and Russian imperialism. He especially focuses on reform efforts by the Turks themselves, whether the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms or the Jadidist movements in Central Asia. Following this discussion is an effective chapter on the differing impact of nationalisms in Turkey and the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union.

There are, however, some considerable weaknesses to this study. I would put them into three categories of ascending importance: editing, authorial choice, and overall conceptualization. First, there are some serious copyediting problems. These include typographical errors, such as "A-Arab" for "Arab" (p. 139), and repetitiveness, such as the dates and details of Tang Princess Ningguo's marriage in two successive paragraphs (pp. 153-54). Indeed, there is a great deal of repetition of details and anecdotes throughout the book, giving the impression that chapters, perhaps even sections, were written separately and inelegantly knit together.

More troublesome are some of the choices Findley makes. Although he presents a fairly thorough survey of the history of the Turks, he neglects the Kipchak Turk Mamluks in Egypt and Syria. This is a significant omission, both for the Mamluks' importance in the history of the Middle East and the way that Mamluk amirs' use of personal troops speaks to Findley's emphasis on the importance of retinues in Turkic rulers' rise to power.

Findley includes major sections on the Xiongnu and Mongol empires, which are vitally important as the predecessors and successors to the first Turkic steppe empire, the Türk. In his discussion, however, Findley seems to imply that the connections between the three states are more those of identity than socio-political organization derived from the commonalities of nomadic steppe life. Although Turks were an important part of Chingiz Khan's Mongol empire, his family was not Turkic. By using the Türk term for the ruler, "kaghan," to refer to the Chingizid dynasty instead of the more usual "khan," Findley projects an association that goes beyond a shared institutional structure.

Throughout the book, Findley prefers the term "Azerbaijani" to "Azeri." This defines this important Turkic people geographically rather than linguistically or ethnically, and undermines Findley's own arguments about the maintenance of Turkic identity across boundaries.

Indeed, this leads to the most significant weakness of the book: Findley's failure to establish a direct definition of "Turk." Findley sets out to show that Turkic identity was maintained across civilizational

boundaries; however, he never clearly defines what that identity is, speaking only of a shared language and "cultural baggage that they carried as they spread across Eurasia" (p. 9). Although he differentiates between "Turkish" for the Turks of the modern Republic of Turkey and "Turkic" for all Turks, in the end Findley seems to accept pan-Turkist and modern Turkish definitions of Turkic identity, relying especially on the ideas of Yusuf Akçura. Findley wants to demonstrate how much diversity there is among the Turks, but in that pursuit fails to show what unifies them as a people.

Findley's study is to be admired for its attempt to place the history of the Turks within the larger context of world history and its wide-ranging discussion of the impact of modernity. Unfortunately, it does not critique the product of that encounter: the conceptualization of a Turkic identity.

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PRE-20TH CENTURY HISTORY

Shiraz in the Age of Hafez: The Glory of a Medieval Persian City, by John Limbert. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2004. xii + 124 pages. Appends. to p. 141. Notes to p. 162. Bibl. to p. 172. Index to p. 182. $22.50 paper.

Reviewed by Franklin Lewis

In 1960, Arthur Arberry wrote *Shiraz: Persian City of Saints and Poets* (Oklahoma University Press), which he believed to be "the first attempt outside Persia to write a history of Shiraz, and the first attempt anywhere to interpret the history of Shiraz." It seems most appropriate, given the strong faculty and student exchange programs of the 1960s and 1970s between Shiraz University (then Pahlavi University, and its Asia Institute) and various universities in the United States (Kent State and the University of Pennsylvania, among others), that an American who once taught at Shiraz provides us with the second English-language monograph on that city.

The author, John Limbert, is former US Ambassador to Mauritania (2000-2003), and like many American academics, first became interested in Iran through a stint there as a Peace Corps volunteer (1964-1966). Limbert went back a few years later to teach English (1969-72) and undertake the research for this book, which was submitted as a Harvard Ph.D. thesis in 1974. It emerges at this date, from what seems a scholarly time capsule, an intellectual memento of a happier era in Iranian-American relations, inspired by the author's obvious love of the city, and based upon "the premise that a city which could produce a poet of Hafez's stature in a period of political instability deserves study on its own merits" (p. 124). Remarkably, Limbert's subsequent experience in Iran, as one of the American hostages held from November 4, 1979 to January 21, 1981, seems in no way to have marred his enthusiasm for and interest in Shiraz.

The book assembles and collates a great deal of very useful background information about the patrician families and the social structure of 14th-century Shiraz from a variety of sources. It draws extensively upon primary and secondary sources published in Persian and English, including about a half-dozen secondary studies in English from the 1990s. It is divided into two parts, focusing first on the political history of the city, in three chapters: "History of Shiraz to the Mongol Conquest" (chapter 1), Shiraz during the Mongol period through the mid-14th century (chapter 2), and "Shiraz as City-State: the Reign of Abu Eshaq Inju and the Mozaffarids" (chapter 3). The second, and most interesting part of the book (chapters 4-6), focuses on the demographics, urban topography, physical structures, economy and sources of revenue, patrician families,

and social and religious institutions of the city. The plentiful charts, tables, and appendices, which detail the genealogies, neighborhoods, mosques, seminaries, chief judges, *naqib*s (leaders of the *sayyed*s), patrician families and dynasties, etc., provide a particularly useful reference tool.

Typographical errors are few (e.g., *qazi al-gozat*, 83 and 87; Sajadi should have a geminated "j" 158, 169; Beiza'I, 85 [this latter due to a most irksome "AutoCorrect" feature in Microsoft Word], etc.). The publishers are to be commended for including the quotations of Persian verse in the original script, even if the verses do not always line up evenly or center correctly on the page (e.g., p. 86). The edition of the *Fârsnâmeh-ye–Nâseri* of Fasâ'i cited in the bibliography (p. 166) is lamented as being in need of a careful modern critical edition; fortunately this desideratum has been provided by Mansur Rastgâr Fasâ'i in a 2-volume critical edition (Tehran: Amir Kabir 1988, repr.1999).

While the poet Hafez is not the focus of the study, the work will assist literary scholars attempting to better understand the socio-political context in which that most iconic of Iranian poets wrote (as well, of course, as Kh^{w}âju-ye Kermâni, 'Obayd-e Zâkâni, Jahân Malik Khâtun, and other 14th-century Shirazi literary figures). Limbert memorably describes Shiraz at this time as a "combination of Athens, Dodge City, the Vatican and Sodom and Gomorrah" (p. 121), though the picture we get is — despite the reconstruction of institutional and familial relations — not as cinematically vivid as all that. The sources do not give us as much specific information as we would hope, in part because their authors tend to flatten detail into the literary mold of expected typologies, and omit the kind of material that would illuminate private life or the life of non-elites. Extracting information from such sources does not therefore lead to a "thick" description of the society or events. Nevertheless, the amount of specific detail amassed here will assist other researchers interested in Shiraz. Much of the information Limbert gives about the structure of Shirazi society in the 13th and 14th centuries, such as the division of patrician families into two tiers of political elites and local aristocracy (p. 93), or the wielding of authority *in persona*, via charisma and social standing, rather than *ex cathedra* (p. 96), etc., will apply in some degree to other medieval Iranian cities, as well. This book should therefore prove useful to those with a wider interest in Islamic cities and urban social structures, with the caveat that, as Limbert suggests (p. 101ff. and pp. 121-24), the particular importance of saints and their shrines for Shiraz, as well as its relative "remoteness from the Mongol invasions" did shape the particular politics and local economy of the city, along with its special culture of piety and pilgrimage.

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WOMEN

Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, by Saba Mahmood. Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2004. xvi + 199 pages. Gloss. to p. 203. Refs. to p. 223. Index to p. 233. $55 cloth; $17.95 paper.

Reviewed by Cynthia Nelson

This book explores "the conceptual challenges that women's involvement in the Islamist movement poses to feminist theory in particular and to secular-liberal thought in general through an ethnographic account of the urban women's mosque movement that is part of the Islamic Revival in Cairo, Egypt" (p. 2). However, Saba Mahmood promises more than an ethnography based on two years of fieldwork (1995-1997). She embarks on an intellectual journey of self-reflection in which she has come "to believe that a certain amount of self-scrutiny and skepticism is essential regarding the certainty of my own political commitments,

when trying to understand the lives of others who do not necessarily share these commitments" (p. xi). By refusing to take her own political stance as the necessary lens through which the analysis proceeds, the author opens up the possibility that "my analysis may come to complicate the vision of human flourishing that I hold most dear and which has provided the bedrock of my personal existence" (p. xii).

It is necessary, the author cautions as she embarks upon her inquiry, not to assume that the political position we uphold will necessarily be vindicated or provide the ground for our theoretical analysis. As readers, we are invited to join her in "parochializing our assumptions, about the constitutive relationship between action and embodiment, resistance and agency, self and authority — that inform most feminist judgments from across a broad range of the political spectrum about non-liberal movements such as the women's mosque movement" (p. 38). It is within that spirit that I have critiqued this book.

The five chapters are a running argument with and against key analytic concepts in liberal thought as these concepts have come to inform various strands of feminist theory through which non-liberal movements, such as the women's mosque movement, are analyzed. Through each chapter Mahmood makes her ethnographic talk back to the normative liberal assumptions about human nature against which such a movement is held accountable. "The Subject of Freedom" illustrates the different ways in which the activism of the mosque movement challenges the liberal conception of politics. Mahmood analyzes the conception of self, moral agency, and politics that undergird the practices of this non-liberal movement in order to come to an understanding of the historical projects that animate it. The pious subjects of the mosque movement occupy an uncomfortable place in feminist scholarship because they pursue practices and ideals embedded in a tradition that has historically accorded women a subordinate status.

"Topography of the Piety Movement" provides a brief sketch of the historical development against which the contemporary mosque movement has emerged and critically engages with themes within scholarship of Islamic modernism regarding such movements. We sense the broad-based character of the women's mosque movement through the author's description and analysis of three of six mosques where she concentrated her fieldwork. Despite the differences among the mosque groups — ranging from the poorest to the upper-middle income neighborhoods of Cairo — they all shared a concern for the increased secularization of Egyptian society and illustrate the increasing respect accorded to the *da'iya* preacher/religious teacher (who undertakes *da'wa*-literally call, summons or appeal that in the 20th century came to be associated with proselytization activity). "Women and the Da'wa" (pp. 64-72) is particularly insightful, as the author juxtaposes the emergence of secular liberalism with the *da'wa* movement and concludes that "the modernist project of the regulation of religious sensibilities, undertaken by a range of postcolonial states (and not simply Muslim states), has elicited in its wake a variety of resistances, responses and challenges…while deeply indebted to the logic of secular liberal government these challenges cannot be understood solely in the practices of the modern state" (p. 78). The analytical labor of the last three chapters is directed precisely at exploring why and how the movements of ethical reform — such as the piety movement — unsettle key assumptions of the secular liberal imaginary even when they do not aim to transform the state.

"Pedagogies of Persuasion" explores questions of authority commanded by the complex figure of the *da'iya*. What kind of authority does the use of the new Islamic knowledge and ethical material evoke? And to what end? Through a series of "ethnographic vignettes," the author highlights three sets of issues: (1) the different practical contexts in which women deployed diverse classical and popular genres of Islamic literature and how disparate modes of argumentation drew upon a shared conception of discursive authority; (2) how the hierar-

chies of class, gender, and generation influenced the kind of Islamic materials selected and (3) the patriarchal conceptions of women's sexuality are debated, interpreted and adapted by Mosque participants from a range of socioeconomic and age backgrounds. Under the theme of, "the modernity of traditional practices," Mahmood concludes that "tradition is not a set of symbols and idioms that justify present practices, neither is it an unchanging set of cultural prescriptions that stand in contrast to what is changing, contemporary or modern. Rather the past is the very ground through which subjectivity and self-understanding of a tradition's adherents are constituted" (p. 115).

"Positive Ethics and Ritual Conventions" moves to an inquiry into ethics from a Foucauldian perspective, requiring that one examine not simply the values enshrined in moral codes but the different ways in which people live these codes. "What is consequential is not whether people follow the moral norms or not but what relationships they establish between the various constitutive elements of the self and a particular norm" (p. 120). Her argument has not focused on contextualizing the individual within a particular structure of the social. Rather, she has "tried to map the contour of the kind of subject presumed to be necessary to the political imaginary of the piety movement (of which the mosque movement is an important part" (p. 152).

While the previous chapters dwelled upon how the ethical practices of the mosque movement have been shaped by and, in turn, have transformed the social field of Egyptian secularity in unexpected ways, the final chapter "Agency, Gender and Embodiment" focuses on how we might think about these ethical practices in the context of relations of gender inequality. Mahmood attends not only to the different meanings of agency as they emerge within the practices of the mosque movement but also "to the kinds of analytic questions that are opened up if agency is analyzed in some of some other modalities — questions that remain submerged if agency is analyzed in terms of resistance to the subordinating function of power" (pp. 153-54). Through her ethnographic analysis on one of the most feminine of Islamic virtues — *al-haya'* (shyness, diffidence, modesty) — necessary for the achievement of piety, Mahmood departs from two dominant perspectives in contemporary feminist theory: one that argues that patriarchal ideologies…work by objectifying women's bodies and subjecting them to masculinist systems of representation thereby negating and distorting their own experience of the corporeality and subjectivity; and the second that regards the recuperation of "women's experience" to be an impossible task. "I do not regard female subjectivity as that which belies masculinist representation; nor do I see this subjectivity as a sign of the abject materiality that discourse cannot articulate" (p. 159). By examining the kind of agency involved when a novice attempts to perfect the virtue of *al-haya'* Mahmood provides the reader with a sophisticated and nuanced understanding of how a life lived in accordance with Islamic virtues affects a woman's ability to inhabit the structure of patriarchal norms that challenges notions of agency presupposed within liberal and post-structural feminist scholarship. "It is only by exploring these norms and traditions in relation to the practical engagements and forms of life in which they are embedded that we can come to understand the significance of that subordination to the women who embody it" (p. 188).

The Epilogue revisits some of the questions with which the book began, concluding that for "the scholar of Islam situated within the Western academy none of these questions can be adequately answered without encountering the essential tropes through which knowledge about the Muslim world has been organized, key among them the trope of patriarchal violence and Islam's (mis)treatment of women" (p. 195). Challenged by academic audiences who ask why she does not condemn the patriarchal assumptions underlying her argument about the veil as a disciplinary practice that constitutes subjectivities, Mahmood defends her mode of intellectual inquiry "by asking

of myself and which I would like to 'pose' to the reader as well are: Do my political visions ever run up against the responsibility that I incur for the destruction of life forms so that 'unenlightened women' may be taught to live more freely? Do I even fully understand the forms of life that I want so passionately to remake? Would an intimate knowledge of the life-worlds distinct from mine ever lead me to question my own certainty about what I prescribe as a superior way of life for others"? These are heady questions for us to ponder, particularly in light of the post-9/11 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Mahmood's book is a *tour de force* that provides an alternative prism through which we may understand the women's mosque movement in Egypt. It is a book rich in original thinking that continually juxtaposes the practices of pietists against secular liberal understanding of agency, body, and authority. It is probably more suited for graduate, than for undergraduate courses, as the author assumes a broad acquaintanceship with Western philosophy. For those looking for "thick ethnographic descriptions," the book will be a disappointment, as the ethnographic vignettes are used more to buttress the author's overall analytic project than to provide an ethnographic account of the everyday worlds of the mosque movement participants. However, for me, that is its strength. By rendering problematic her own taken-for-granted assumptions about the Islamic revival and the feminist subject "through an exercise of disciplined suspension of judgment toward the normative limits of political discourse"(p. 198), Mahmood is able to open up questions that a secular-liberal lens forecloses. I highly recommend *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* for anyone who claims to be a scholar of Muslim women, the Islamic revival, and contemporary Islamic politics in our contemporary historical moment.

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Woman's Identity and the Qur'an: A New Reading, by Nimat Hafez Barazangi. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2004. xii + 136 pages. Notes to p. 147. Sel. Bibl. to p. 164. Index to p. 172. $59.95.

Reviewed by Amina Wadud

Women's Identity and the Qur'an: A New Reading makes a valuable contribution to the Islamic scholarship-activism explosion of the 21st century. Barazangi's Introduction and first two chapters tediously push to locate what is unique in her work. Once she moves beyond attempts to prove her own autonomy and authority within the discipline of Qur'anic interpretation, she actually unveils her strengths in curriculum design. She reiterates the processes of her lifelong research and committed interactions with community activists. The monograph moves through small jagged rocks to climb a mountain, the mountaintop yields a worthwhile view of her aim to present a new pedagogy of Muslim higher learning. This review starts at the peak and limits consideration of the rocky beginnings.

Chapter 3, "Autonomous Morality and the Principle of Modesty," combines the two topics in a heretofore-unused formula. The principle of modesty replaces the distorted popular emphasis on Muslim women's dress and the historical-cultural practice of segregating women and men in Muslim society, which, as the author points out, prevented the woman from authority on her own behalf and reduced her to proxy morality. Proxy morality, as practiced in early Islam, including by the wives and daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, she says, does not fulfill the Qur'anic mandate for full human moral agency. Baranzangi then makes her case for autonomous morality. She is "guided by two levels of autonomy" (p. 60). The first relates to every Muslim's "endowment of intelligence, ethics, and decision making" capacity. The second relates to the family as "the starting point to create a system of tranquility, independence and partnership for the welfare"

of husband, wife and children. Although this depiction of the nuclear family has some shortcomings previously analyzed by Western feminists and proponents of the traditional extended family, the author's goal seems to be the inclusion of human relationships in the fulfillment of autonomy and moral agency.

Chapter 4, "Gender Equality (*al-Musawah*) and Equilibrium (*Taqwa*)," critiques the oft-used terms of neo-traditionalists, gender "equity" and "complimentarity." Although she erroneously considers "responsibility" in men to be biological (as if female child bearers are biologically irresponsible) she still does not concede to the idea that when a man "stands up to responsibility" (*qawamah*) it means that he "stand(s) out in rank." Contrary to today's realities (including single female heads-of-household) she claims, "all men are financially responsible…." Yet, she does not allow this cultural practice of male *qawamah* to counter women's moral autonomy. Furthermore, *taqwa*, "the balance of individual conscientious moral choice and social action" (p. 74), is given an unconditional, gender inclusive interpretation, provided that women apply Islamic injunctions while "going through the process of generating meaning or developing polic(ies)" (p. 68).

Chapter 5, "Self-Identity and Self Learning: A Shift in Curriculum," presents "The seven determinants of Islamic curriculum" — the "goal of this long range project" and of the book. Having already distinguished between religious education and Islamic higher learning, a "collective, integrated process" called "metacognitive learning" (p. 87) she introduces an integrative Curriculum, where the learner is free and responsive to "pluralism, secularism and the preservation of the individual's belief" (p. 89) through the following determinants: "Pluralism: The Private and the Public Domains"; "Secularism: The Normative and Scientific Discourses"; "Practical, Procedural, and Ideals Knowledge of Islam"; "Text Comprehension and Textual Reproduction"; "Human Knowing and Revelation Knowledge"; "Instruction or Mentoring and Self-Learning, or Ijtihad" "'Modern' Learning versus 'Traditional' Strategies"; "Educational Objectives of the Self Learning Islam"; "Learners' Needs and Interests"; "Learners' Interactivity"; "The Muslim Woman's Education"; "Dualism in Education"; "Transforming the Multicultural Discourse"; and "The Gender Equation."

In her Introduction, Barazangi proposes to make a unique contribution to the development of a dynamic "self-identity" in Muslim women by establishing a "new venue for exploring and engaging the sources of Islamic education and Islamic higher learning within the frame work of the Qur'anic mandate" (p. 18). Chapters 1 and 2, as elsewhere throughout the monograph, are used primarily to locate her work by unnecessarily critiquing other scholarly contributions to Qur'anic studies. As one so skilled in recognizing both scholarship and learning, Barazangi speaks as an academic in the United States of Syrian background. It is disappointing that the tremendous gains in policy reforms that affect the actual lives of Muslims by the plethora of genuine activists, male and female, are categorically ignored in this work, and that scholarly contributions of living and dead modern Qur'anic interpretation are privileged to so much critique and misrepresentation. While Barazangi continually borrows from these scholars' contributions, she only cites them when she critiques them. Perhaps if modern Islamic studies had been seen as a kind of scaffolding, wherein the efforts of *many* build towards a comprehensive future in Islamic thought and action, she might have started with the strengths of her own contribution in curriculum development and properly acknowledged the strengths and weakness of others.

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